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ABSTRACT
Natural threats like earthquakes, hurricanes or tsunamis have shown seri-
ous impacts on communities. In the past, major earthquakes in the United
States like Loma Prieta 1989, Northridge 1994, or recent events in Italy like
L’Aquila 2009 or Emilia 2012 earthquake emphasized the importance of pre-
paredness and awareness to reduce social impacts. Earthquakes impacted
businesses and dramatically reduced the gross regional product. Seismic
Hazard is traditionally assessed using Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Anal-
ysis (PSHA). PSHA well represents the hazard at a specific location, but
it’s unsatisfactory for spatially distributed systems. Scenario earthquakes
overcome the problem representing the actual distribution of shaking over
a spatially distributed system. The performance of distributed productive
systems during the recovery process needs to be explored.
Scenario earthquakes have been used to assess the risk in bridge networks
and the social losses in terms of gross regional product reduction. The
proposed method for scenario earthquakes has been applied to a real case
study: Treviso, a city in the North East of Italy. The proposed method
for scenario earthquakes requires three models: one representation of the
sources (Italian Seismogenic Zonation 9), one attenuation relationship (Sa-
betta and Pugliese 1996) and a model of the occurrence rate of magnitudes
(Gutenberg Richter). A methodology has been proposed to reduce thou-
sands of scenarios to a subset consistent with the hazard at each location.
Earthquake scenarios, along with Mote Carlo method, have been used to
simulate business damage. The response of business facilities to earthquake
has been obtained from fragility curves for precast industrial building. Fur-
thermore, from business damage the reduction of productivity has been
simulated using economic data from the National statistical service and a
proposed piecewise “loss of functionality model”. To simulate the economic
process in the time domain, an innovative businesses recovery function has
been proposed.
The proposed method has been applied to generate scenarios earthquakes
at the location of bridges and business areas. The proposed selection method-
ology has been applied to reduce 8000 scenarios to a subset of 60. Subse-
quently, these scenario earthquakes have been used to calculate three system
performance parameters: the risk in transportation networks, the risk in
terms of business damage and the losses of gross regional product. A novel
model for business recovery process has been tested. The proposed model
has been used to represent the business recovery process and simulate the
effects of government aids allocated for reconstruction.
The proposed method has efficiently modeled the seismic hazard using
scenario earthquakes. The scenario earthquakes presented have been used
to assess possible consequences of earthquakes in seismic prone zones and
to increase the preparedness. Scenario earthquakes have been used to sim-
ulate the effects to economy of the impacted area; a significant Gross Re-
gional Product reduction has been shown, up to 77% with an earthquake
with 0.0003 probability of occurrence. The results showed that limited funds
available after the disaster can be distributed in a more efficient way.
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Natural hazard threaten life. Intense storms can damage farm and flood
large areas, hurricanes proved to be very intense when dealing with complex
modern cities, consider for a moment what the Katrina Atlantic hurricane
did to the East coast in 2005. The hurricane disrupted electricity in the big
city, but, other than coastal cities it destroyed several houses and facilities
inland. It has been defined the deadliest and most destructive hurricane
casing property damage for $81 billion of 2005 USD. Last year, hurricane
Sandy caused losses for $50 billion of USD.
Figure 1.1: The Richter mag-
nitude 7.5 Messina
earthquake and re-
lated tsunami caused
up to 200’000 casu-
alties on December
28, 1908 in Sicily and
Calabria[4].
On the other hand earthquakes proved
to be even worse when dealing with losses,
both in terms of life and monetary.
Earthquakes are known to cause injuries
and death, they cause damage to road and
bridges, general property damage, collapse
or severe damage to buildings. After an
earthquake the territory experiences dif-
fuse fire, interruption of water supply, elec-
trical outage, gas distribution disruption,
sewage damage, transportation system dis-
connections. In addiction to that, diseases
can spread due to lack of hygienic supplies.
When the epicenter is located offshore, a
big displacement of seabed can produce a
tsunami.
Government agencies along with the na-
tional protection agencies are involved in the process of supporting hit pop-
ulation and are required to rebuild infrastructure and housing and helping
the economy to recover and restart.
Induced seismicity requires major attention. Let’s think of large amount
of water stored behind a dam, the earthquake could suddenly release it
flooding and destroying large areas. The perforation of wells, coal min-
ing and oil drilling are practices known to increase the consequences of an
earthquake. As example, Sichuan earthquake was one of the most deadly
earthquake of all times with 69’227 fatalities, the effect of the earthquake
was increased by the resonant response of the water inside a dam over the
underlying fault, this is a terrible example of induced seismicity.
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The most noticeable effects of earthquakes are ground shaking and ground
rupture. Along with that, landslides and avalanches are reported after an
earthquake. The damage caused by shaking to both the electrical power and
gas line frequently induces fire. The shaking effects in saturated granular
soils can induce liquefaction and the consequent loss of bearing capacity.
In general terms, an earthquake may cause injuries and deaths, road and
bridge damage, property damage of structures and content. Some earth-
quakes are followed by diseases that spreads after the quake.
As shown in table 1.1when an earthquake hits a populated and developed
area the property damage become consistent and, generally speaking, the
direct losses in term of property damage are tens to hundreds of billions of
USD. Magnitude isn’t directly connected with the extent of damage, 1906
San Francisco earthquake of magnitude 7.8 caused 9.8 billions of actualized
USD while 6.1magnitude (almost 100 times smaller) 2012 Emilia earthquake
caused 13.2 billions of USD of losses.
Rank Name Magnitude Property
damage USD
1 2011 Tohoku, Japan 9.0 122 billion
2 1995 Great Hanshin , Japan 6.9 100 billion
3 2008 Sichuan, China 8.0 75 billion
4 2010 Chile, Chile 8.8 15⇠30 billion
5 1994 Northridge, United States 6.7 20 billion
6 2012 Emilia, Italy 6.1 13.2 billion
7 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand 6.3 12 billion
8 1989 Loma Prieta, United States 7.0 11 billion
9 921 earthquake, Taiwan 7.6 10 billion
10 1906 San Francisco, United States 7.8 9.5 billion
Table 1.1: Property damage caused by earthquakes. Source:[1]
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The 9.03 Mw undersea Tohoku earthquake occurred in Japan in 2011, had
a duration of 6 minutes and it’s well remembered because of the tsunami
wave that hit the coastal cities and induced a nuclear incident with radia-
tion release. According to World Bank the total losses induced by that earth-
quake are of 235 billion USD. The World Bank economist, Vikram Nehru,
states that after the Kobe 1995 earthquake Japan took one year to rebound
its productivity back to 85% of normal level [20].
￿.￿.￿ 1989 Loma Prieta
In California the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was a major earthquake that
struck San Francisco Bay area in the late afternoon. The earthquake lasted
for 15 seconds with an intensity of 6.9 Mw. The quake killed 63 people in
Northern California (57 by the jolt, the further 6 due to fatalities following
the earthquake), and left 3’000-12’000 people homeless. The earthquake
caused severe damage in some location in the San Francisco Bay Area, and
it has been estimated that 11 billion USD was the total property damage.
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￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Relief efforts were helped by private donation and by the relief package for
California signed by former president George W. Bush.
Figure 1.2: The San Francisco-
Oakland Bay bridge
suffered relatively
minor damage. A
76-by-60-foot (23m x
15m) section of the
upper deck on the
eastern cantilever
side crashed onto
the deck below. The
quake caused the
Oakland side of the
bridge to shift 7in
(18cm) to the east.
The quake caused the
bolts of one section to
shear off, sending the
250-short-ton (230t)
section of roadbed
crashing down like a
trapdoor. This fault
directly killed nobody,
except for a driver bad
instructed by road
assistance personnel.
On San Francisco–Oakland Bay bridge (Figure 1.2 ) one section collapsed
and crashed onto the deck below.
The worst disaster of Loma Prieta earthquake was the collapse of the
entire Cypress Street Viaduct (Figure 1.4 ) of I880 in West Oakland: a failure
of a 1.25 mile section that killed 42 people.
The Viaduct was built in late 1950s using reinforced concrete with non
ductile design of sections and detailing. In 1977 a retrofitting was made,
but did not fix the problem of possible buckling of the columns and didn’t
account the possible effects of the soil liquefaction. After the earthquake the
complete rebuilding of the viaduct took 11 long years.
The BART1 rail system was undamaged, but became soon congested as it
was the quickest way to to San Francisco. In addition to BART, a disused
transportation system revived: the Transbay Ferries service was re–activated
during the closure of the Bay Bridge as alternative to the overcrowded BART.
The1989 Loma Prieta showed the importance of the problem of transporta-
tion network failure under earthquake.
Along with this two major faults in bridges, other freeways experienced
traffic problems, i.e. SR 480, I 280, U.S. Route 101, SR 17, SR 1. (Figure 1.5 )
￿.￿.￿ 1994 Northridge
Later, in 1994 the Southern California “Northridge” earthquake hit the ur-
ban area of Los Angeles recording the strongest ground acceleration of 1.7g
with a moment magnitude of 6.7Mw. The epicenter was in San Fernando
Valley but the effects were felt in a radius of 85 miles(125km). The death
1 Urban rail transportation system that serves the city of San Francisco and the Bay area
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Figure 1.3: Failed support columns and collapsed upper deck of the Cypress Street
Viaduct.
Figure 1.4: Detail of the bad anchorage of the rebar in Cypress Stree Viaduct.
toll of Northridge earthquake is estimated between 60 and 75 casualties.
8’700 people were injured and 1’600 of them required hospitalization. The
Northridge Fashion Center and California State University, Northridge also
sustained very heavy damage with the most notably collapse of parking
structures.
The earthquake gained worldwide media coverage because of a vast dam-
age to freeway network that impacted the everyday life of millions of com-
muters. The most important damage was to I-10 Santa Monica Freeway that
took three months to be repaired. Further north, the I-5 Golden State Free-
way (Figure 1.6 , the collapsed bridge) and SR14 Antelope Valley freeway
collapsed. The interchange was rebuilt one year later. It has been reported
that the rail service was briefly interrupted.
The quake produced an unusually strong ground acceleration of 1.0g
while damage was caused mainly by fire subsequent the earthquake and
by landslides. Some estimates of the total damage range it as high as 25
billion USD.
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Figure 1.5: State Route 1 collapsed in western Watsonville over Struve Slough after
the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.
Figure 1.6: Northridge Earthquake, CA, January 17, 1994; Many roads, including
bridges and elevated highways were damaged by the 6.7 magnitude
earthquake. Approximately 114’000 residential and commercial struc-
tures were damaged and 72 deaths were attributed to the earthquake.
Damage costs were estimated at 25 billion USD. FEMA News Photo, Au-
thor: Robert A. Eplett
Most of casualties and damages occurred in multi-story wooden build-
ings. In particular, buildings with an unstable first floor (such as the ones
built on “pilotis”, the soft-floor) performed the worst. Numerous fires were
also caused by broken gas lines from houses shifting off their foundations
or unsecured water heaters tumbling. In the San Fernando Valley, several
underground gas and water lines were severed, resulting in some streets
experiencing simultaneous fires and floods. Damage to the system resulted
in water pressure dropping to zero in some areas, predictably affecting fire–
fighting operations. Five days after the earthquake it was estimated that be-
tween 40’000 and 60’000 customers were still without public water service.
As typical in earthquakes, unreinforced masonry buildings and houses on
steep slopes suffered more damage. This event was also connected with the
unusual medical emergency: the spread of the Valley Fever disease.
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￿.￿.￿ Losses connected with earthquakes
It is evident that the earthquake induced risk must be assessed, estimated
and evaluated in order to increase the preparedness, to retrofit unsafe struc-
ture and to increase the level of safety. Several elements contribute to this
type of risk: casualties, direct economic losses of properties and indirect
economic losses from the reduction of the productive capacity of industrial
area.
On transportation side, the damage to network induces a bigger loss. Ac-
cording to ACI (Italian motor club) in Italy there are 3’983’502 trucks, that
ship the 91% of the total 1’327 million of tons shipped every year(data from
Istat: Italian National Statistical Institute). According to data from the minis-
ter of Transportation in Italy (published in 2004 CNIT report), there are 156
ports, 19’472 km of railroads and 837’493 km of public streets and 6’532 km
of highways and 98 airports. In Italy in 2011 the Gross Domestic Product
was of 2,19 trillions of USD.
Figure 1.7: Railway system in Italy, from OpenStreetMap Project.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Earthquakes with epicenter close to urban areas, such as 1994 Northridge
and 1995 Kobe earthquakes, have caused extensive physical damage to
buildings and utility networks[8]. Damage to buildings resulted in signif-
icant direct losses (in terms of repair and replacement costs) and indirect
losses (e.g. losses of decreased productivity). The performance of lifelines
such as transportation, water, and electricity networks both immediately
after the earthquake and after some time has effect on indirect economic
losses. Among these lifelines, the transportation network is of critical im-
portance since it provides the medium for transfer of personnel and ma-
terials required for recovery, repair and reconstruction. Moreover, recent
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earthquakes have shown that transportation networks, in particular bridges,
have high seismic vulnerability.
To be prepared for catastrophic events and reduce economic losses, it is
peculiar to estimate the physical damage and economic losses from pos-
sible earthquakes with a good reliability. Since lifelines, like transportation
networks, have a non linear behavior due to their intrinsic nature and the re-
sponse to damage complex models are needed. Earthquake loss estimation
involves many complexities and uncertainties related to earthquake occur-
rence, the effects of ground motion on buildings, and the resulting direct
and indirect economic losses. The indirect economic losses depend not only
on induced damage, but also on the post–earthquake recovery process and
speed, which is affected, in turn, by limited capacity of the damaged net-
work. The interaction among different economic sectors and geographic
regions (mediated by the transportation network) makes it difficult to iso-
late regions or components of the system for analysis purposes. Due to
these complexities, previous loss estimation studies have generally limited
their scope and approach or confined themselves to a specific geographical
scale.
When dealing with distributed systems and lifelines many factors affect
the response of the system: the level of detail is limited by system size, by
the big computational requirements involved in analysis, it has deal with the
limited amount of available data. This section reviews some of the previous
studies on regional loss estimation with a special regard to transportation
networks. Some methodologies (e.g. ATC-13 or HAZUS) are comprehensive
as they consider damage to buildings, bridges and utility network compo-
nents and are not limited to building losses. Others concentrate on specific
systems such as the transportation network (REDARS) or consider only se-
lected loss components (HAZUS).
One of the earliest attempts of a comprehensive seismic loss estimation
methodology is ATC-13, which has been developed in California. The ATC-
13 methodology estimates earthquake damages and direct economic losses
based on macroseismic intensity data and expert opinion. Moreover, ATC-
13 concentrates on the estimation of damages and direct economic losses
and does not deal with indirect losses or the effect of damage to transporta-
tion network but considers recovery time. ATC-13 also serves as the basis
of more recent methodologies such as HAZUS, that is one of the most com-
prehensive regional loss estimation methodologies with the capability of
application at different geographic scales. Rather detailed methods have
been implemented to model ground motion, ground failures, and structural
and nonstructural damages to buildings, the transportation network, and
lifeline components. HAZUS also evaluates induced social and indirect eco-
nomic losses. Indirect economic losses include changes in employment, loss
in tax revenue, and production losses due to reduced demand. The only
transportation related loss considered is the direct loss from damage to the
transportation network. HAZUS lacks the capability to perform a trans-
portation network analysis. Since transportation capacity constraints are not
considered in the economic balancing process, indirect losses from commod-
ity flow disruption, increased travel distances, and their evolution over time
during the recovery phase are not evaluated. HAZUS is being increasingly
used by the public sector in seismic risk analysis and policy decisions. For
example, FEMA used HAZUS to evaluate the annualized losses for build-
ings in the US (FEMA- 366). The study used USGS seismic hazard maps
and default parameters of HAZUS in calculating annualized losses.
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In 1996 Basoz and Mander[27] made the first attempt to quantify the risk
of a transportation network after an earthquake event for emergency plan-
ning purposes. Shinozuka in 2000 [32] looked at the performance of high-
way network in the Los Angeles area after the 1994 Northridge earthquake
and proposed a probabilistic framework to predict the effect of bridge re-
pairs after the event. In 2003 prof. Shinozuka and his team published an-
other study for the same area. Using Monte Carlo simulation they estimate
the damage of bridges and then run a simulation of the transportation net-
work to evaluate consequences to the performance of the system. Cho et
al. in 2001[9] developed a loss estimation methodology for the Los Angeles
metropolitan region, where the earthquake impact on the transportation sys-
tem and industrial sectors are modeled. Businesses in the affected region are
assumed to interact through commodity flows on the urban transportation
network. The reduced capacity of the transportation network along with
the reduced transportation demand are considered. However, only recovery
of the business firms is considered while recovery of the transportation net-
work over time is modeled assuming damaged bridges closed for a period of
one year. The use of models and data specific to southern California limits
applicability beyond the Los Angeles region. Werner et al. in 2000[34] use a
detailed transportation network model to estimate direct losses and indirect
losses due to increased travel times, damage is estimated through fragility
curves and uncertainty are explored through Monte Carlo simulation. Prob-
ability distributions of economic losses computed using seismic scenarios
and by calculating the corresponding losses using Monte Carlo simulation.
The recovery of transportation system is included for the transportation net-
work, not considering damage to buildings environment and the associated
changes in supply and demand in different economic sectors. Data require-
ments limit the scope of the approach to small regions. A. Kiremidijan
[21] assessed the damage of the Bay Area transportation network bridges
using four earthquakes scenarios and simulated the network performance
using both fixed and variable post event trip demand. In the same study
Authors address the problem of post event emergency response planning
and present an example application to six hospitals located in the East Bay.
Erdem Karaka in his PhD thesis examined, using anova techniques, the re-
sponse of CSU region to earthquake events giving some details on how to
model the problem[14]. In 2006 Moore et al.[25] explored the impact of elec-
tric power loss in the economy of Los Angeles and Orange County areas
and on the transportation network. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency developed Hazard U.S., written in short form as HAZUS, a soft-
ware for risk mitigation and planning. The methodologies in[2]estimate the
structural and the downtime losses to different systems after natural disas-
ters; however, these methodologies do not have capabilities for transporta-
tion network post event analysis. Until recently, no software packages were
available for the risk assessment of network systems. Absence of software
packages means that researchers and practitioners need to develop their
own models and assumptions. In an effort to overcome this lack of tools,
the California Department of Transportation is developing software for Risk
from Earthquake damage to Roadway Systems (REDARS). REDARS is a
seismic risk analysis software package that estimates the structural and oper-
ational losses of transportation networks systems and is expected to enable
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to improve its ability to
plan for and respond to earthquake emergencies. Stergiou and Kiremidjian
in 2006 proposed a framework for a probabilistic analysis of the problem
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of calculation of risk in transportation network with a special attention to
bridges and account the effects of shaking and liquefaction of soil[33].
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
The goal of the present thesis is to formulate a methodology to quantify the
risk to transportation network and productive systems and explore their re-
lations. In addition to the general practice that deals solely with direct struc-
tural losses, this work proposes an expandable framework that accounts for
the operational loss caused by damage to network loss and by losses from
reduced production. In addition to what has been done, the problem of the
losses in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) due to damage to productive facili-
ties is addressed. The present work addresses the problem of the transitory
phase of the reconstruction process.
To test the applicability of the method, an analysis on the area of Treviso,
in Veneto region on North-East Italy, has been done. The reduction of contri-
bution from Treviso area to Gross Domestic Product(GDP) in terms of Gross
Regional Product(GRP) is the result of the present analysis, along with the
problem of relation to transportation network.
￿.￿.￿ Known and Unknown
In Italy the Civil Protection agency required the production of the earth-
quake hazard maps (Figure 1.8 ). The assigned working group produced
an aggregate hazard map [12] using the PSHA methodology proposed by
Cornell in 1968 [10]. Further details will be given in section 3.2.1 .
Figure 1.8: The hazard map of Italy with 10% of probability of exceeding in 50 years.
Some attempts have been made in past to analyze the effect of an earth-
quake to small transportation networks, but an approach to a regional trans-
portation network with a fine detail (up to local streets) to observe the re-
duction of capacity in precise way has never been done before.
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In Italy no seismic scenarios are publicly available, although hazard anal-
ysis are available for structural design purposes. To analyze the response of
distributed systems, hazard consistent scenarios should be developed.
Risk analysis of complex areas is possible using the information from seis-
mic scenarios together with information about the fragility of infrastructures
and buildings.
Why it’s important to conduct seismic risk scenarios analyses?
According to EERI[17], a scenario earthquake analysis can help in provid-
ing a common foundation for the analysis of the earthquake risk. It helps
identifying the flaws of the system and enlightens its strengths. An earth-
quake scenario simulation helps in engaging and informing stakeholder and
community decision makers. By simulating, it helps in examining the alter-
native futures. Lastly, it helps in testing and training people involved in the
process and the broad audience.
What can be done to prevent damages from a catastrophic earthquake?
Traditional PSHA [10] is not enough to show the effect of earthquakes.
From the physics of the system we know that waves travel from the ipocen-
ter to buildings and lose some energy during their travel. PSHA is the best
hazard analysis when dealing with a point system without spatial extension,
but if the analysis is focused on a distributed system, scenario earthquakes
are needed to account the spatial feature of the problem.
The present work addresses the lack of seismic scenarios to perform risk
analysis in distributed systems. Here is presented a methodology to account
the risk to transportation systems and business interruption of productive
areas. The connection between the loss of regional product and the trans-
portation system is shown. A novel model to represent the reconstruction
process in time domain is presented. An estimate of the prioritization of the
the government financial aids is given in the last part of the work with a
benefit cost analysis.
The proposed procedure starts from acquiring data about the seismicity
in the area of analysis. Data is processed to generate earthquake scenarios;
to obtain the description of earthquake at each location of analysis. Using
fragility curves the seismic performance of infrastructures is derived. Fur-
ther models can relate the residual productivity of businesses and damage
to transportation network. The two contribution are unified to obtain the
seismic risk in terms of reduced revenue from businesses and increased
travel cost in transportation network. The procedure can be used for opti-
mization of budget, to perform benefit cost analysis, to assess the possible
expenses in insurance market.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
The schema of the present work is organized as follows.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ Introduction of the problem. The chapter presents some back-
ground information about earthquakes, it presents the state of the art
of the Seismic Risk Analysis and the scientific motivation of the work.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ covers the Basics of theory behind the problem. It states the
problem in general terms, it deepens the problem of earthquake model-
ing, presents some previous work from which some models are drawn.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ deals with the materials and methods used in the present thesis
starting from the general methodology, going through the problem of
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￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
development of a transportation network risk curve. Then it covers
the availability of input data and describes the proposed algorithm to
solve this problem. The chapter presents also the proposed models
to account for the reduction of functionality of business areas, the re-
construction process and the model to account for the changes in both
network and transportation demand after an earthquake. At the end
of each module of the proposed methodology the results are summa-
rized and some insights about the findings are presented.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ present the results of the work, explores possible applications
of the proposed procedure and expresses some possible future works.
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Transportation is a derived demand. From its definition, transportation
demand is an implicit demand to provide a service, to transform, buy or
ship a good. The level of service of a network, after a seismic event, is given
by the equilibrium between the demand and the supply.
The equilibrium equation account two terms; the supply is affected by the
earthquake because it reduces the level of service of the network and the
connectivity of the network; while on the other hand, the demand decreases
(or in specific cases, it can increase due the effect of demand surge). The
behavior of a transportation network is strictly related to the response of
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its components this implies that damage of network component affects the
performance of the whole network.
Determining the seismic risk is key step in the planning of the manage-
ment of extreme event response. Seismic risk analysis is a tool that helps to
obtain data and information about the risk itself and provides an estimation
of the economy of the process.
The proposed methodology gives information about the performance of
complex systems after an earthquake, this methodology can be expanded to
be multi-perils and account different sources of hazard, e.g. floods, hurri-
canes, storms, etc.
The output of this procedure can be of interest for different stakeholders,
different levels of the public administration can be interested; owners or
manager of transportation network can use the procedure for planning pur-
poses and national protection agencies can use this informations for rescue
and preparedness.
With the outcomes of the proposed procedure it’s possible to:
• determine the economic risk of an insurance company portfolio;
• improve the quality of insured risk by identifying its weakness;
• help the political decision makers to be aware when budgeting retrofitting
policies;
• define the retrofitting priority of existing infrastructures;
• help the planning process of extension of a network to increase its
redundancy to seismic action;
• to plan the transportation policies in post-event;
• and others that will be explained in the text.
The proposed procedure can be run off-line pre–event for economical anal-
ysis, or performed in real time for a quick estimation of the the most proba-
ble losses of an asset.
To analyze the problem there are four main steps:
1. Estimate the hazard of the region of study;
2. Analyze the fragility of the components of the system;
3. Define the residual functionality of components of the system;
4. Account the losses in terms of direct losses of properties, indirect
losses due to increased travel time and losses of productivity due to
damage to productive infrastructures.
The proposed methodology is multi–disciplinary because different exper-
tise are required to understand the problem from specific point of view,
earth scientists, engineers, data modelers, urban planners, economists. The
procedure is composed in several moduli to understand the complexity of
the problem, each one of the to model a specific component of the problem;
each module can be improved, updated, implemented without affecting the
functionality of the rest of the procedure. Since the big number of elements
involved in the analysis a big amount of data is generated. Some specific out-
put are chosen to represent a specific feature of the problem, anyway thanks
to its modular design, the procedure can show data in different shapes ac-
cording to the role of the user.
To summarize, the procedure can be used to:
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• In finance by insurers, lenders, building stock managers, investment
funds on properties, etc. to calculate the risk as economic exposure of
their portfolio.
• In public agencies for planning before the earthquake:
– define the strengths and the weakness of the system,
– give an estimation of the effect of different policies in the system,
– to plan the future expansion,
• for civil protection finalities, after the quake to:
– evaluate the possible expenditures for the insurance and re-insurance
market,
– give a quick estimation of damage to property and infrastructure
– serve as a tool to plan the emergency response both from the
humanitarian and economic view
Shaking scenario 
Business interruption 
Risk as loss of 
production Financial aids 
Industrial 
building 
reconstruction 
Transportation analysis 
Risk as 
transportation 
delay 
Risk as 
emergency 
response 
Reconstruction 
cost bridges 
Risk 
Figure 2.1: The conceptual schema that starts from Shaking Scenario, computes busi-
ness interruption and transportation system damages and, as final out-
come, the earthquake risk.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
As past earthquakes have shown, earthquake induced losses can be cate-
gorized in two types: direct and indirect losses. In the same way seismic
risk assessment needs to account these two categories: Direct losses are the
economical loss due to collapse or damage of infrastructure or building, In-
direct losses are related to the purpose that the particular infrastructure or
building serves, for a bridge the indirect loss refers to increase in travel time
in the transportation that the specific bridges belongs or the inaccessibility
of a location; in case of industrial building the indirect cost is the loss of
profit connected with the scope that serves the building. In the later case,
a building can have moderate damage but be assessed as unsafe for occu-
pants; in this case people cannot work inside due to security issues and the
production is stopped. Two examples of indirect losses have been shown.
According to Jelienek and Krasumann [19], risk in abstract terms is the
product of hazard, vulnerability and exposure as in equation (1) . This
definition can be applied to different type of hazard (i.e. earthquake as in
15
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the present work, floods, hurricanes, structural reliability); the relation has
a general meaning and applicability to different risk analyses.
R = H⇥ V ⇥ E (1)
where:
R is Risk
H is a description of Hazard
V is a measure of the vulnerability due to the speci-
fied Hazard level, in general terms V(H)
E is the economic value of exposed goods, defined as
Exposure, in general terms can be E(V ,H)
￿.￿.￿ Seismic risk analysis for distributed systems
In 2000 Chang, Shinozuka and Moore [8] published a foundation paper for
Seismic Risk Analysis (shortened in “SRA”) for spatially distributed sys-
tems. The paper addresses the problem of performing seismic risk analysis
on distributed systems and specifically addresses problems that arise from
the spatial feature of the problem. First, the spread in space of a set of infras-
tructures is the key characteristic that invalidates the efficacy of PSHA [10]
or DSHA. That type of analysis has been conceived for a point infrastruc-
ture, for this reason the paper proposes an extension of PSHA to spatially
distributed systems. Authors underline that the correlation between differ-
ent location is the key to perform SRA for distributed systems. As first step
they develop a set of deterministic earthquake scenarios and then assign
the probability of occurrence of each scenario from geological characteris-
tics of faults. They prove that these scenarios are hazard consistent with
the hazard maps derived from USGS. The set ofearthquake scenarios has
been made using EPEDAT by Eguchi et al. [13]. Using the acceleration of
scenarios and fragility curves they build damaged networks where a trans-
portation analysis is run.
According to FEMA the benefit of a mitigation measure is considered cost-
effective if the expected benefit exceeds costs, the problem is expresses in
equation (2) .
Bt =
Z
h
[L0(h, x)- LR(h, z)] · p(h, x) (2)
where:
Bt total Benefit from mitigation intervention
x a specific site where the analysis is done
h a measure of earthquake hazard, such as PGA
L0(h, x) loss at site x, given a specific hazard level h, without
mitigation
LR(h, x) loss at site x, given a specific hazard level h, with
mitigation
p(h, x) annual probability of an earthquake that produces
a specified hazard level at site x
Equation (2) needs a modification to be extended to the context of spa-
tially distributed systems risk analysis.
The probabilistic hazard is discretized to indicate individual scenario earth-
quakes and the loss is measured for the entire system, rather than at a par-
ticular site. The expected annual benefit for mitigation of equation (2) can
be rewritten as:
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Figure 2.2: The highway network in Los Angeles and Orange counties used in [8].
Bt =
NX
i=1
(L(S0|Qi)- L(SR|Qi)) · pi (3)
where:
Bt total Benefit from mitigation intervention
N total number of possible earthquakes
L loss of functionality
S0 system performance without mitigation
SR system performance with mitigation
Qi i-th possible earthquake
pi annual probability of i-th possible earthquake
Authors suggest that a smaller subset of scenario earthquakes may be
used to reduce computation times to a reasonable extent but retaining the
same accuracy to fully represent the risk curve choosing only some hazard
consistent scenarios.
The paper presents also a model to relate the damage index of bridges
to the link damage index, with this model it’s possible to build earthquake
degraded networks.
Dl =
vuuut GlX
g=1
 2gl (4)
where:
Dl link damage index on link l
Gl total number of bridges on link l
 gl bridge damage index, bridge g on link l
17
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
By
: [
C
D
L 
Jo
ur
na
ls
 A
cc
ou
nt
] A
t: 
18
:1
7 
15
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
20
08
 
374 A. Kiremidjian et al.
account ground shaking, liquefaction, and landslides in the direct loss computations, the
equations become:
where,
FIGURE 1  Risk assessment methodology for highway network systems.
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A = ground shaking severity and can represent either peak 
ground acceleration or response spectral acceleration, or 
another appropriate parameter;
horizontal ground displacSH = ement due to either liquefaction or landslides;
verticaSV = l ground displacement due to either liquefaction or landslides.
Figure 2.3: The methodology proposed by Kiremidjian et al in [21].
￿.￿.￿ Seismic risk assessment for transportation network: Kiremidjian etal. approach
In 2007 Kiremidjian et al. published a work on seismic risk assessment in
transportation network systems[21]. The authors present a work on estima-
tion of losses due to earthquake to transportation systems accounting the
integrated effect of ground shaking, liquefaction and landslides at network
component level and system level. The risk from earthquakes to transporta-
tion systems is eva uated in terms of direct lo s from damage to bridges and
travel delays in the transportation network. The damage and loss to bridges
from ground shaking from ground displacement, from liquefaction and
from landslides are computed for a 7.0 scenario earthquake. The authors
present the transportation network damage analysis using a fixed demand
(i.e. the pre-earthquake d ma d) and a variable (post-event degraded) de-
mand. Their findings s ow that tr vel times remain rela ively unchanged
or decrease with variable demand assumption. The method they propose is
tested on San Francisco bay area.
The proposed formal approach by Kiremidjian et al. (shown in figure 2.3
) is summarized by equation (5) .
For a given earthquake event Qi the total losses E[Loss], i.e. the sum of
direct and increase of network travel time are:
E[Loss = Qi] =
Z1
0
l(D|Qi) · fD(d|Q- i)dd+
Z1
0
l(t|Qi) · fD(d|Q- i)dd (5)
where:
l(D|Qi) Cost of repair of components
fD(d|Q- i) Probability density of Damage D due to an event Qi
l(t|Qi) Cost associated with time delays
For a specific set of earthquakes each one of them with a specific occur-
rence rate ⌫i the risk becomes:
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E[Loss = Qi] =
X
allevents
E[Loss|Qi] · ⌫i =
X
allevents
⌫i
Z1
0
l(D|Qi) · fD(d|Q- i)dd+
Z1
0
l(t|Qi) · fD(d|Q- i)dd (6)
At this point integral in equation (6) is split into three parts to account for
shaking, liquefaction and landslide. The analysis follows with the applica-
tion to San Francisco Bay area using one scenario earthquake.
Authors estimate the repair cost as in equation (7) , where the repair cost
is a function of the damage.
l(D|Qi) = RepairCost = RepairCost Ratio ·Area ·Cost (7)
In the application to Bay Area in San Francisco, where is susceptible of
liquefaction. In this case losses induced by liquefaction dominate the risk as
shown in table 2.1 .
Ground shaking only Shaking + liquefaction Shaking + landslides
494’046 USD 1’392’593 571’497
Table 2.1: The losses in Bay area application divided according to cause in applica-
tion by Kiremidjian et al. 2007 [21].
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The performance of a social system subject to earthquake has a complex re-
sponse due to its intrinsic complex nature. The system can be observed from
several point of views. From the structural engineering point of view the
damage to structure as buildings or bridges can be interesting and enough
for the purpose. Others can study the performance of utilities, their re-
lated disruptions and effects to society as discomfort. Moreover, others can
observe the performance of the transportation system and the flow redistri-
bution. From the economic point of view an interesting topic can be the loss
of productivity of the region stroke by the earthquake. In this study two
different point of view have been merged, the transportation performance
has been simulated with the residual productivity of the region stroke by
the earthquake, the relation between the two systems has been investigated
and a model to account the connection between the two systems has been
proposed. The present problem has been divided into four parts.
The first part deals with construction of hazard consistent seismic scenar-
ios, that are needed for seismic risk analysis.
The second part explores the effect of the seismic action to industrial fa-
cilities and proposes several models to relate the seismic action as input to
the residual production in monetary terms.
The third part of the work deals with the consequences to the transporta-
tion system. Given the seismic scenario, total network performance is rep-
resented as a consequence of the transportation demand assigned to the
damaged network.
The forth, and last, part deals with the reduction of transportation de-
mand and the assignment of this varied demand to a damaged transporta-
tion network that concludes the work with the computation of seismic risk.
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(Adapted from Kramer 1996 [22].)￿.￿.￿ Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis
At the beginning of earthquake engineering the prevalent type of analysis
was the deterministic, due to its simplicity in calculation and results.
A Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis (DSHA) involves the develop-
ment of a particular seismic scenario upon which a ground motion hazard
evaluation is based. A typical DSHA can be described as a four-step process
(as in Jayaram 2010 [18]) consisting of:
• Identification and characterization of all earthquakes sources capable
of producing significant ground motion at the site. Source character-
ization includes the definition of each source’s geometry (the source
zone) and earthquake potential.
• Selection of a source-to-site distance parameter for each zone. In most
cases the shortest source to site distance is used.
• Selection of the controlling earthquake (i.e. the earthquake that is ex-
pected to produce the strongest level of shaking), generally, expressed
in terms of some ground motion parameter, at the site. The selection
is made easy by comparing the levels of shaking produced by earth-
quakes (from step 1) assumed to occur at the distances identified in
step 2. The controlling earthquake is described in terms of size and
distance from the site.
• The hazard at the site is formally defined, usually, in terms of the
ground motion produced at the site by the controlling earthquake. Its
characteristics are usually described by one or more ground motion
parameters obtained from predictive relationships. Peak acceleration,
peak velocity, and response spectrum ordinates are commonly used to
characterize the seismic hazard.
Concluding, DSHA is the best tool to obtain the worst case scenario for
design of structures.
￿.￿.￿ Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
The use of probabilistic concepts allowed to account uncertainties in the size,
location, and rate of recurrence of earthquakes and the variation of ground
motion characteristics with earthquake size and location.
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) provided a framework in
which these uncertainties can be identified, quantified, and combined in a
rational manner to provide a more complete picture of the seismic hazard.
Cornell in 1968 described the methodology to perform PSHA [10].
The PSHA can also be described as a procedure in four steps ( according
to Reiter 1990 [29]), where each step has some degree of similarity to the
steps of the DSHA procedure.
1. The first step is identification and characterization of earthquake sources,
with the probability distribution of potential rupture locations within
the source. These distributions are combined with the source geom-
etry to obtain the corresponding probability distribution of source-to-
site distance.
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2. Next, the seismicity or temporal distribution of earthquake recurrence
must be characterized. A recurrence relationship, which specifies the
average rate at which an earthquake of some size will be exceeded, is
used to characterize the seismicity of each source zone.
3. The ground motion produced at the site by earthquakes of any pos-
sible size occurring at any possible point in each source zone is de-
termined with the use of predictive relationships (GMPE). The un-
certainty inherent in the predictive relationship is also considered in
PSHA.
4. Finally, the uncertainties in earthquake location, earthquake size and
ground motion parameter prediction are combined to obtain the prob-
ability that the ground motion parameter will be exceed on a particu-
lar time period (e.g. 10% of exceeding probability in 50 years, i.e. a
Return Time of 475 years).
￿.￿.￿ Earthquake source characterization
Characterization of an earthquake source requires consideration of the spa-
tial characteristics of the source and the distribution of earthquakes within
that source, of the distribution of earthquake size for each source, and of the
distribution of earthquakes with time. Each of these spatial characteristics
involves some degree of uncertainty.
￿.￿.￿ Spatial uncertainty
For the purposes of seismic hazard analysis, the source zones may be similar
to or somewhat different than the actual source, depending on the relative
geometry of the source and site of interest and on the quality of the informa-
tion about the sources. For example, a relatively short fault from a site can
be modeled as a point since the distance can be assumed constant. Earth-
quakes are assumed to be uniformly distributed within a particular source
zone (i.e. earthquakes are considered equally like to occur at any location).
The attenuation relationship needs a source to site distance, that has its own
uncertainty, the uncertainty in source to site distance can be described by a
probability density function.
￿.￿.￿ Size uncertainty
All source zones have a maximum earthquake magnitude potential that can-
not be exceeded. In general, the source zone will produce earthquakes of
different size up to the maximum earthquake, with smaller earthquakes oc-
curring more frequently than larger ones. The strain energy may be released
a-seismically or in form of earthquakes; assuming that all strain energy is
released by earthquakes of magnitude from 5.5 to 9.0 and that the average
fault displacement is one half the maximum surface displacement the size
of earthquake can be defined by a mechanical model.
￿.￿.￿ Gutenberg-Richter Recurrence Law
Gutenberg and Richter gathered data for Southern California earthquakes
over a period of many years and organized the data according to the number
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of earthquakes that exceeded different magnitudes during that time period.
They divided the number of exceedance of each magnitude by the length
of the time period to define a mean annual rate of exceeding  m of an
earthquake of magnitudem. As would be expected, the mean annual rate of
small earthquakes is greater than that of large earthquakes. The reciprocal
of the annual rate of exceeding for a particular magnitude is commonly
referred to as the return period of earthquakes exceeding that magnitude.
When the logarithm of the annual rate of exceeding of southern California
earthquakes was plotter against earthquake magnitude a linear relationship
was observed as shown in equation (8) .
log  m = a- b ·m (8)
Where  m is the mean annual rate of earthquakes of magnitude m, and
10a is the mean yearly number of earthquakes of magnitude grater than
or equal 0, and b describes the relative likelihood of large and small earth-
quakes. As the b value increases, the number of larger magnitude earth-
quakes decreases compare to those of smaller magnitude.
The a and b parameters are generally obtained by regression on a database
of seismicity for the zone of interest.
Unless the zone is particularly active, the database is likely to be relatively
sparse. Since the use of both instrumental and historical events is usually
required, the database may contain both magnitude and intensity data, ne-
cessitating the conversion of one measure of size to the other. In some
areas, the record of seismicity may be distorted by the presence of depen-
dent events such as after-shocks and fore-shocks. Although such events can
cause significant damage, PSHA is intended to evaluate the hazard from dis-
crete, independent release of seismic energy. Therefore, dependent events
must be removed from the seismicity database and their effects accounted
in separate analyses.
Completeness of the database must also be considered.
Fitting a straight line such as that implied by the Gutenberg-Richter law
through recurrence data in which the mean rate of exceeding of small earth-
quakes is underestimated will tend to flatten the line.
Seismogenic sources have a limit in their earthquake potential, this means
that the the GR relationship should be limited by an upper bound like
mmax.
The standard GR relationship can be trimmed in order to account the
maximum event and to exclude events with a lower intensity:
m0 will be the lower magnitude accounted while mmax is the maximum
expectable event, equation (8) is re–arranged as (9) . The shape of the model
is curved on logarithmic plot, while the previous expression was linear.
 m = ⌫ · exp(- (m-m0))- exp(- (mmax -m0))
1- exp(- (mmax -m0))
(9)
with the constraint m0 6 m 6 mmax and   = 2.303 · b.
￿.￿.￿ Characteristic earthquake recurrence law
The Gutenberg Richter law was developed for a set of regional seismicity
data that may include many different seismic sources. Since PSHA are usu-
ally conducted for a specific site rather than large regions, the earthquake
generating characteristics of individual faults is important.
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Paleosismic studies indicate that individual points on faults and faults
segments move by approximately the same distance in each earthquake.
This has been interpreted to suggest that individual faults repeatedly gen-
erate earthquake of similar (within about one-half magnitude unit) size,
known as characteristic earthquakes at, or near, their maximum magnitude.
Alternatively, the apparently repetitive nature of fault movement at in-
dividual points may be controlled by localized geological constraints and,
consequently, not reflect earthquake magnitude very accurately. Resolution
of these alternative interpretations awaits further paleoseismic research.
By dating characteristic earthquakes, their historical rate of occurrence
can be estimated. Geologic evidence indicates the characteristic earthquakes
occur more frequently than would be implied by extrapolation of the GR
law from high exceeding rates (low magnitudes) to low exceeding rates
(high magnitudes). The result is a more complex recurrence law that is
governed by seismicity data at low magnitudes and geological data at high
magnitudes.
￿.￿.￿ Ground Motion Predictive relationships
The predictive relationships are nearly always obtained empirically from
least square regression on a particular set of strong motion data. Since then,
some amount of scattering is always present in data. This scatter results
form randomness in the mechanism of rupture and from variability and
heterogeneity of the source, travel path, and site condition.
Scatter in data can be quantified by confidence limits or by standard devi-
ation of the predicted parameter. Reflecting the form of the most common
predictive relationships, the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of
the predicted parameter is usually computed. This considerable uncertainty
must be accounted in computation of the seismic hazards.
The probability that a particular ground motion parameter Y exceeds a
certain value, y⇤, for an earthquake of given magnitude, m, occurring at a
given distance, r, in probabilistic terms is given by (10)
P[Y > y ⇤ |m, r] = 1+ FY(y⇤) (10)
where FY(y) is the value of CDF of Y at m and r.
￿.￿.￿ Temporal uncertainty
To calculate the probabilities of various hazards occurring in a given time pe-
riod, the distribution of earthquake occurrence with respect to time must be
considered. Earthquakes have long been assumed to occur randomly with
time, and in fact, examination of available seismicity record has revealed lit-
tle evidence of temporal patterns in earthquake recurrence. The assumption
of random occurrence allows the use of simple probability models, but it’s
inconsistent with the implications of elastic rebound theory.
The temporal occurrence of earthquakes is most commonly described by
a Poissonian process. The Poisson model provides a simple framework for
evaluating probabilities of events that follows a Poisson process, one that
yields values of a random variable describing the number of occurrences of
a particular event during a given time interval or in a specified spatial region.
Since PSHAs deals with temporal uncertainty the spatial application of the
Poisson model will not be considered further.
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Poisson processes possess the following properties:
1. The number of occurrences in one time interval are independent of the
number that occur in any other time interval.
2. The probability of occurrence during a very short time interval is pro-
portional to the length of the time interval.
3. The probability of more than one occurrence during a very short time
interval is negligible.
These properties indicate that the events of a Poisson process occur ran-
domly, with ”no memory” of the time, size, or location of any precedent
event. For a Poisson process, the probability of a random variable N, re-
peating the number of occurrences of a particular event during a given time
interval is given by:
P[N = n] =
µne-µ
N!
(11)
where µ is the average number of occurrences of the event in that time
interval. The time between events in a Poisson process can be shown to
be exponentially distributed. To characterize the temporal interval distribu-
tion of earthquake recurrence for PSHA purposes, the Poisson probability
is usually expressed as (12) .
P[N = n] =
( t)ne- t
n!
(12)
where   is the average rate of occurrence of the event and t is the time
period of interest. Note that the probability of occurrence of at least one
event in a period of time t is given by (13) .
P[N > 1] = P[N = 1] + P[N = 2] + · · ·+ P[N =1] = 1- P[N = 0] = 1- e ·t
(13)
When the event of interest is the exceeding of a particular earthquake
magnitude, the Poisson model can be combined with a suitable recurrence
law to predict the probability of at least one exceeding in a period of t years
by the expression (14) .
P[N > 1] = 1- e m·t (14)
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
The problem of business damage is complex due to the very inter-related na-
ture of economic processes. Business damage contributes to the definition
of risk because it’s the main component of indirect losses along with the
increase in travel time in transportation networks. The main theory behind
economic loss modeling is the equilibrium between supply and demand.
Direct damage to properties and pre-event economic conditions (unemploy-
ment rate, import-export balance, the shape of the economic system) are the
main feature of the problem. The possible funding by state in form aids
after seismic event can condition the process. As past earthquakes revealed
the magnitude of indirect losses is usually 10 to 100 times the direct loss.
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It is well know that an earthquake can cause effects also on un-affected
economic sectors due to business relation causing the effect known as “rip-
ple effect”. All businesses are know to be both forward linked and backward
linked. The forward link represents the businesses need to sell their product,
the demand can come from the affected region or outside. The backward
link express the fact that each business needs raw material or semi-worked
goods to produce its products. The best model to account this effect would
a micro-economics model that simulates the relation between businesses or
sectors of activity. It’s interesting to note that, if previous agreements are
made, the failure in supply of product could imply to pay a penalty. Some
industries in the supply chain for the automotive market were declared
failed due to the payment very high penalties that was unsustainable.
16-14 
Chapter 16 – Indirect Economic Losses 
 !L = Portion of loss estimate (reconstruction/replacement) to which margin 
adjustment applies. 
 !YM = Manufacturing expenditures after margin adjustment. 
 !T = Retail/wholesale, trade or transportation expenditures. 
 tm = Retail/wholesale, trade or transportation margin. 
 
 
16.4.2 Supply-Side Adjustments and Rebalancing the Economy 
 
The Indirect Loss Module is a computational algorithm that utilizes input- utput 
coefficients to reall cat  surviving production.  The algorithm computes post-event 
excess demands and supplies. It rebalances the economy by drawing from imports, 
inventories, and idle capacity when supplies are constrained.  It allows for inventory 
accumulation, production for export (to other regions) and sales to meet reconstruction 
needs in the event that normal demands are insufficient to absorb excess supplies   The 
proce s of reallocation i  gov rned by the amount of imbalance detected in each of the 
economy's sectors.  Rebalancing is accomplished iteratively by adjusting production 
proportionately until the discrepancy between supplies and demands is within a tolerable 
limit.
7
  A simple schematic of the process is provided in Figure 16.4. 
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Figure 16.4 Indirect Loss Module Schematic 
                                                 
7The tolerable limit is the degree to which the solution values vary from one iteration to the next. 
Figure 2.4: Conceptual schema for the estimation of indirect losses in the framework
of Hazus.
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In Europe a projects on “assessment of risk in european cities” has been
founded by European Commission during the FP6, this project is: “An ad-
vanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios with applications to different European
towns” [26]. The main objective of the project was to estimate the risk of eu-
ropean towns, to increase the awareness of population on risk management
procedures and to increase awareness of political managers in risk reduction.
The idea was to simulate earthquake scenarios to get data about damages,
casualties, economical impacts, direct and indirect costs to give city man-
agers tools to improve their ability to manage extreme case scenarios when
dealing with risks. A main work package of the project was about the def-
inition of seismic hazard in european towns; the outcome of this scenario
was a group of maps to represent earthquake scenarios.
This project developed some seismic hazard maps using the determinis-
tic and the probabilistic approach, it then presented a comparison of the
results of the two procedures. The main scope of this work package was the
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definition of quantitative description of the scenarios using homogeneous
parameters to describe the seismic hazard.
The WP6 of the project dealt with lifelines. It particularly it studied the
functionality of water supply, of waste management, energy, telecommu-
nication and transportation system. These system play a key role in the
emergency management and in community functionality, they help to save
human lives and prevent more damage to properties.
Usually the spatial characteristic of the lifelines goes behind the urban
boundaries, with a specific discrepancy between demand and supply (con-
sider the water supply system, water is produced in a location and then
used miles away.) These systems are made up of networks of connected
point and line infrastructures in a strong relation between them. These
systems are interconnected, and their relations are hard to understand and
forecast.
For each of these lifelines some common traits can be defined to describe
their performances:
• compile an inventory of elements at risk;
• define seismic hazard and shaking scenarios;
• elaborate fragility models;
• compute recovery models;
￿.￿.￿ Procedure to define the risk in lifeline systems
The procedure proposed in RiskUe project can be explained as shown in
figure 2.5 .368 Bull Earthquake Eng (2006) 4:365–390
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Fig. 1 Flowchart of RISK-UE methodology
Table 1 Breakdown of a typical railway transportation system
Rolling Stock Railway Facilities Railroad Infrastructure
Buildings Specific infrastructures
– Terminal stations; –Bridges;
– Maintenance; – Tunnels;
– Control house; – Retaining walls;
– Administrative – Overpasses;
– Drainage systems
Utilities Track’s installations
– Electric power; – Level crossings;
– Fuel facilities; – Signaling;
– Water/Waste water – Electro-motion;
– Gas – Telecommunication
Tracks
inventories (Monge et al. 2004) are a synthesis and enhancement of similar inven-
tory databases, initially developed for the seismic risk assessment of lifelines in USA
(ALA 2002; NIBS 1999, 2004; ATC-13 1985 etc) and adequately adapted to consider
the European distinctive features. A representative example of such questionnaire is
given below for the water-pipelines (Table 2).
Based in the above inventory catalogues, all relevant data should be collected for
the lifeline networks in each city, and incorporated in a GIS platform. The accurate
description of the distinctive features in the light of the seismic risk evaluation is
Figure 2.5: Flowchart of RiskUe procedure for lifelines.
According to [26] lifelines present the following characteristics:
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• spatial distribution in a very large area, where supply and demand
are not located in the same area;
• the structure is made up of different nodes and links connected to-
gether with multiple critical elements;
• each network has a specific group of characteristics that make their
description complex;
• some network have a specific redundancy that lowers the vulnerabil-
ity, like the interconnection between power lines and every re–routing
according to the geometry;
• most networks are inter–dependent, due to this feature special atten-
tion is required in the evaluation of risk.
Lifelines are particularly exposed to earthquake, principal damages to
this type of infrastructure are due to ground shaking, liquefaction, slope
instability and permanent ground deformation.
In accordance to Hazus [2], RiskUe states that the most common de-
scription of performance after earthquake of lifelines is made by the use
of fragility curves, and particularly five damage states are defined:
1. No damage
2. Slight
3. Moderate
4. Extensive
5. Complete
In addition to these performance level other information are needed to
describe the residual level of service. The first parameter to account is the
definition of the residual degree of functionality; i.e. complete functionality
that mens no damage or cosmetic damage; damage factor and its replace or
repair cost expressed as a percentage from 0% to 100%.
The consequences can be assessed also in terms of injuries to people, dam-
age to non structural components or direct economic losses related to re-
place or repair of the component. The indirect losses can arise from the loss
of productivity and loss of profit, or can be related to the sensation of fear,
uncertainty or other psychological reasons. The losses due to environmental
damage, pollution and etc. are even harder to estimate.
The main requirement of this procedure is the ability to judge the perfor-
mance of a damaged component in relation to the level of seismic action that
he experienced. Usually this relation is described by mean of a probabilis-
tic relationship that relates the residual functionality to shaking intensity,
and the several other models that accounts the relation between the residual
functionality and the economic losses. Typically the relation between the in-
tensity measure of the action and the state of damage is given by the mean
of probabilistic fragility curves; these are log–normal curves where descrip-
tive parameters like mean and dispersion are computed from regression of
historical data.
Along with the fragility curves, in order to describe the recovery process,
the functional recovery curves are defined. To account for the recovery tran-
sitory, some specific times need to be defined. The first time is the “normal”
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condition. This is how the component or the system behave during nor-
mal times. The second time is the “recovery” time; during recovery time
the system has been stroke by the earthquake but activities are recovering,
housing is recovering. This is a transition time between the pre–earthquake
conditions and complete restoration after the quake. On more specific time
is the so–called “day zero”. Day zero is the immediate post earthquake; one
can find still the ruins on the streets, rescue team trying to help people and
emergency restoration of services.
￿.￿.￿ Transportation system
Among other lifelines the transportation system is one of the most critical
because it allows to rescue people in need, to ship good, to satisfy the basic
need of transportation for various reasons, both work–related or for leisure.
The transportation system usually is made up of:
• roads;
• bridges;
• tunnels.
Other structural construction can be accounted:
• slopes;
• river banks;
• retaining walls;
• accessory buildings (warehouse, toll booth, etc.).
Past experiences showed that damages to transportation systems has a
severe impact on the local economy, to the recovery process and on recovery
operations.
Based on historical data infrastructures can be ranked according to their
vulnerability level with respect to ground shaking. The most vulnerable are
bridges, followed by river banks or retaining walls and lastly tunnels. In
urban areas the main cause to road un–availability is the presence of debris
from the collapse of buildings.
￿.￿.￿ Bridges vulnerability
As previously mentioned, bridges are the most vulnerable elements in trans-
portation systems, usually their redundancy is none. The damage to a
bridge implies a long detour and an increase in total transportation time.
RiskUe procedure is derived fromHazus, and describes bridges according
to the following set of parameters:
• material;
• structural schema;
• type of piles;
• type of bearings;
• slab continuity;
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• code of design;
• span number;
• skewness angel;
• span length;
• pile height;
• number of expansion joints;
• type of foundation system.
Given the information from historical earthquakes typical bridge damages
can be:
• damage to approaching slabs;
• collapse of the slab due to unseating or excessive displacements;
• damage to piles due to excessive bending moment or shear demand;
• damage to foundation due to high shear demand.
The procedure to account the vulnerability of bridges follows as shown
in 2.6.1 .
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
In California several studies have been made to assess the transportation
network post-earthquake functionality. A tool for California has been de-
veloped by Werner et al. [34], the tool is called REDARS 2. The technical
manual present a possible definition of the problem of definition of a seis-
mic risk analysis on transpiration systems. In figure 2.6 the conceptual
model of the software is described. A following schema about a possible
workflow to define the recovery is shown in figure 2.7
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Bridges damage
The damage of bridges in transportation network is modeled using fragility
curves as described in Hazus methodology [2]. The transportation module
accounts the possible damage to three key elements of transportation infras-
tructures: road, bridges and tunnels. For each component of the transporta-
tion system the relation between damage index DI and earthquake intensity
IM is given by the mean of fragility curves:
DI = f(IM) (15)
where:
DI is damage index
IM is a certain intensity measure of earth-
quake(PGA,Sa,PGD,PGV).
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The fragility curves for bridges are defined by a set of parameters that
account for the geographical position, the typology, the mechanical char-
acteristics. Data about damage is inferred from the NBI (National Bridge
Inventory) using the following parameters:
• seismic design of the bridge;
• number of spans: one span or multiple spans;
• material: concrete, steel, others;
• type of piles: mono-columns, multi-columns, abutments;
• type of bearing and seismic isolation;
• if the static scheme is continuous or simply supported.
The functional form for fragility curve is a cumulate log-normal distribu-
tion:
P[ds|PGA] =  

1
 ds
ln
✓
PGA
PGAd,ds
◆ 
(16)
Where:
  is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm
of PGA of damage state, ds
  is the standard cumulative log-normal distribution
function
The table in figure 2.8 allows to classify bridges according to Hazus method-
ology.
Hazus procedure suggest a five steps procedure to evaluate bridge fragility:
￿￿￿￿ ￿ As first step gather all data about position, bridge class, span num-
ber, skewness angle, span length, bridge width.￿￿￿￿ ￿ Evaluate quake intensity at bridge location, in temrs of PGA, spec-
tral accelerations ( Sa[0.3s] e Sa[1.0s]), PGD.￿￿￿￿ ￿ Determine updating parameters8>>><>>>:
Kskew =
p
sin(90- alpha)
Kshape = 2.5⇥ Sa(1.0s)Sa(0.3s)
K3D = 1 + A/(N-B)
(17)
￿￿￿￿ ￿ Update the base fragility parameters according to the following
rule:8>>>><>>>>:
New Medianslight = Old Median⇥ Factorslight
New Medianmoderate = Old Median⇥Kskew ⇥K3D
New Medianextensive = Old Median⇥Kskew ⇥K3D
New Mediancomplete = Old Median⇥Kskew ⇥K3D
(18)
where: Factorslight = 1 if Ishape = 0 else min(1,Kshape)￿￿￿￿ ￿ Using the updated mean values along with dispersion   = 0.6 eval-
uate each damage level probabilities according to quake level.
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Table 7.2 HAZUS Bridge Classification Scheme 
CLASS NBI Class State Year Built 
# 
Spans 
Length of 
Max. Span 
(meter) 
Length 
less than 
20 m 
K3D 
(See note 
below) 
Ishape  
(See note 
below) 
Design Description  
HWB1 All  Non-CA < 1990  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Conventional Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB1  All  CA < 1975  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Conventional Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB2  All  Non-CA >= 1990  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Seismic Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB2  All  CA >= 1975  > 150 N/A EQ1 0 Seismic Major Bridge - Length > 150m 
HWB3  All  Non-CA < 1990 1   N/A EQ1 1 Conventional Single Span 
HWB3 All  CA < 1975 1   N/A EQ1 1 Conventional  Single Span 
HWB4  All  Non-CA >= 1990 1   N/A EQ1 1 Seismic  Single Span 
HWB4  All  CA >= 1975 1   N/A EQ1 1 Seismic  Single Span 
HWB5 101-106 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional 
Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support -
Concrete 
HWB6 101-106 CA < 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support 
- Concrete 
HWB7 101-106 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support 
- Concrete 
HWB7 101-106 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support 
- Concrete 
HWB8 205-206 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 0 Conventional 
Single Col., Box Girder - 
Continuous Concrete 
HWB9 205-206 CA >= 1975      N/A EQ3 0 Seismic 
 Single Col., Box Girder - 
Continuous Concrete 
HWB10 201-206 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional Continuous Concrete  
HWB10 201-206 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional  Continuous Concrete  
HWB11 201-206 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Concrete  
HWB11 201-206 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Concrete  
HWB12 301-306 Non-CA < 1990     No EQ4 0 Conventional 
Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support -
Steel 
HWB13 301-306 CA < 1975     No EQ4 0 Conventional 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support 
- Steel 
HWB14 301-306 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support 
- Steel 
HWB14 301-306 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple Support 
- Steel 
HWB15 402-410 Non-CA < 1990     No EQ5 1 Conventional Continuous Steel 
HWB15 402-410 CA < 1975     No EQ5 1 Conventional  Continuous Steel 
HWB16 402-410 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Steel 
HWB16 402-410 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Steel 
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Table 7.2 HAZUS Bridge Classification Scheme (Continued) 
CLASS 
NBI 
Class 
State 
Year 
Built 
# Spans 
Length of 
Max. Span 
(meter) 
Length 
less than 
20 m 
K3D 
(notes 
below) 
Ishape  
(notes 
below) 
Design Description  
HWB17 501-506 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional 
Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB18 501-506 CA < 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Conventional 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB19 501-506 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB19 501-506 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ1 0 Seismic 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Prestressed 
Concrete 
HWB20 605-606 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 0 Conventional 
Single Col., Box Girder - 
Prestressed Continuous 
Concrete 
HWB21 605-606 CA  >= 1975     N/A EQ3 0 Seismic 
Single Col., Box Girder - 
Prestressed Continuous 
Concrete  
HWB22 601-607 Non-CA < 1990     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional Continuous Concrete 
HWB22 601-607 CA < 1975     N/A EQ2 1 Conventional  Continuous Concrete 
HWB23 601-607 Non-CA >= 1990     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic Continuous Concrete 
HWB23 601-607 CA >= 1975     N/A EQ3 1 Seismic  Continuous Concrete 
HWB24 301-306 Non-CA < 1990     Yes EQ6 0 Conventional 
Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Steel 
HWB25 301-306 CA < 1975     Yes EQ6 0 Conventional 
 Multi-Col. Bent, Simple 
Support - Steel 
HWB26 402-410 Non-CA < 1990     Yes EQ7 1 Conventional Continuous Steel 
HWB27 402-410 CA < 1975     Yes EQ7 1 Conventional  Continuous Steel 
HWB28          
All other bridges that are not 
classified 
 
EQ1 through EQ7 in Table 7.2 are equations for evaluating K3D.  K3D is a factor that 
modifies the piers’ 2-dimensional capacity to allow for the 3-dimensional arch action in 
the deck.  All of the equations have the same functional form; K3D = 1 + A / (N – B), 
where N is the number of spans and the parameters A and B are given in table 7.3. 
 
The Ishape  term (given in table 7.2) is a Boolean indicator.  The Kshape factor is the 
modifier that converts cases for short periods to an equivalent spectral amplitude at T=1.0 
second. When Ishape = 0, the Kshape factor does not apply.  When Ishape = 1, the Kshape factor 
applies.  Later in this section, the use of the Kshape factor will be illustrated through an 
example. 
 
The 28 bridge classes in Table 7.2 (HWB1 through HWB28) reflect the maximum 
number of combinations for ‘standard’ bridge classes.  Attributes such as the skeweness 
and number of spans are accounted for in the evaluation of damage potential through a 
modification scheme that is presented later in this section. 
HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual 
Figure 2.8: Excerpt from Hazus Technical manual [2] about the bridge classification.
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Sa(1.0s) for ground shaking PGD [in] ground failure
Class Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
HWB1 0.40 0.50 0.70 0.90 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB2 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB3 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB4 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB5 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB6 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB7 0.50 0.80 1.10 1.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB8 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.80 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB9 0.60 0.90 1.30 1.60 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB10 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB11 0.90 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB12 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB13 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB14 0.50 0.80 1.10 1.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB15 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.10 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB16 0.90 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB17 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB18 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB19 0.50 0.80 1.10 1.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB20 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.80 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB21 0.60 0.90 1.30 1.60 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB22 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB23 0.90 0.90 1.10 1.50 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB24 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB25 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.90 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB26 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.10 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB27 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.10 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
HWB28 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.70 3.90 3.90 3.90 13.80
Table 2.2: Mean values for each bridge class according to Hazus fragility estimation procedure [2]
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Figure 7.6 Fragility Curves for Conventially Designed Major Bridges (HWB1). 
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Figure 7.7  Fragility Curves for Seismically Designed Major Bridges (HWB2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Example of fragility curves as given in the Hazus manual[2]
￿.￿.￿ Businesses damage
To be consistent with the model adopted for bridges, damage to business
is computed following the same approach, i.e. the fragility curves express
damage as a function of the seismic action.
Fragility curves for industrial buildings are derived from the Hazus pro-
cedure. Fragility curves will be further sampled to obtain the probability of
each one of the four damage states according to level of earthquake.
For the specific problem is assumed that the fragility of the most com-
mon building of the stock represents the fragility of the entire stock. This
assumption is necessary because there’s not enough data to particularize
fragility curves for each and every business.
In north-east Italy, productive buildings are generally made of pre-cast
concrete, while other areas are built using steel or wooden frames. For the
specific applic tion concr te pre-cast, tilt up building have been assumed
for the description of the fragility of productive areas.
￿.￿.￿ Residual functionality
Sensibly, residual functionality of a productive building is strongly bonded
to the damage state of the building where the production is made.
Given that, in present work authors decided to adopt a step model. It has
been noted that productive plants with no damage, maintain the production
as if no–earthquake occurred. If the damage is slight, some minor repairs
are needed and the reduction of productivity is very low, ranging from 10%
to 30%. If the damage is moderate, the work needed to restore the buildings
is harder and lowers more the production, almost it cuts in half the residual
productivity of the area. If the area suffered a stronger stroke, only few
building are in condition to allow the production; this can be accounted with
a reduction around 80%. If the buildings are collapsed the production is no
longer possible; the proposed model assumes that residual functionality is
null. A description of the residual functionality model is given at page 66
with figure 3.6 .
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￿.￿.￿ Damage to transportation network
The problem of network damage is quite complex since it deals with model-
ing of the reduction of supply in problem of transportation equilibrium.
It’s necessary to build damaged networks, where each link supported or
overpassed by a bridge express a reduction in its functionality due to its
damage state.
The solution of this problem has been realized using two matrices to rep-
resent the belonging of a bridge to a specific link. Matrix AL!B express
the correspondence of Links to Bridges, while the transpose of the matrix
represents the correspondence of Bridges to Links: ATL!B = AB!L. The
correspondence expressed by this matrix is: one-to-many, since each link
can have multiple bridges; from this follows that A is non-invertible, i.e.
A 6= A-1.
To the extent that the network description in present model is very fine
and local roads are modeled, it’s important to note that if a bridge collapse
over a road that road is not transit able. To account this effect two incidence
matrices are given; the first express the incidence of bridges that belong to
a specific road:
AbelongL!B (19)
while a different matrix account the bridges that overpass other links.
AoverpassL!B (20)
In the present problem AoverpassL!B is much sparser than A
belong
L!B .
The following model has been adapted from Shinozuka et al. 2000[32]
and Chang et al. 2000[8] as described in paragraph 2.1.1 . The description
of the link damage is provided by a vector defined LDI, that is Link Damage
Index, as:
LDIl =
vuutnBRIDGESX
p=1
↵l,pBDI2p
||nBRIDGES||
(21)
where:
LDI is Link Damage Index, an index vector that stores,
for each iteration, the damage of specific link
p is the summation index over the total number of
bridges that have a relation with Link l, from 1 to
nBRIDGES
↵l,p is the entry of incidence matrix to relate link l to
bridge p
BDIp is the p-th bridge on link l .
It should be noted that it’s necessary to normalize the summation of the
BDI over each link because the number of bridges that are related to each
link can vary greatly an induce errors in definition of LDI.
The composition of LDI follows the rule:
LDIl,s =
8<: if LDI2overp,s > LDI2collapse !
q
LDI2bel,s + LDI
2
overp,s
if LDI2overp,s < LDI2collapse !
q
LDI2bel,s
8 link
(22)
The conversion form literal damage of bridges is made as:
while the link damage index is converted as follows.
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Description BDI
No damage 0,00
Minor 0,10
Moderate 0,30
Extensive 0,75
Collapse 1,00
Table 2.3: Bridge Damage Index BDI
Once the bridge damage has been obtained to build a damaged network
it’s essential to define a model to reduce the level of service of each network
link.
From definition of link damage index the damaged network will be al-
tered as:
Link functionality reduction
No damage 100
Minor damage 100
Moderate damage 50
Major damage 1
Collapse 1
Table 2.4: Link functionality reduction model
The presented functionality reduction is translated into reduction of net-
work level of service as:
￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ The level of service of the link is identical of its state
pre–earthquake, no reductions will be applied.
￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ The chosen reduction, after a discussion with network
managers, has modeled as:
1. Reduction of free-flow speed to a limited value of 30 km/h (18.6
mph)
2. Reduction of free flow time according to new speed limit
3. Freight truck detour, due to lowered level of reliability of bridges.
￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ This state is a complete loss of functionality, the link is
closed and traffic needs to detour. The closure of the link is obtained
via the penalty method, so the free flow time is such high that no
vehicles choose that route.
￿.￿.￿ Post earthquake transportation demand
An earthquake changes also the level of transportation demand. Past cases
have shown different alternative circumstances, a demand reduction (like
in Loma Prieta 1989) or a demand increase due to increased demand of
goods (as happened in Kobe 1995 earthquake). In the present application
we assume that, since the productive system has a decrease of production
itself, the demand should follow in the same way. This hypothesis can be
removed using an economical model to simulate the equilibrium between
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different sectors of industry and to simulate the demands of materials of
reconstruction.
The idea is to simulate the relation with a damaged network and a de-
mand that varies due to earthquake damage to activity system. As previ-
ously expressed, in present work we don’t represent damage to residential
system.
Starting from the observation that freight demand is strongly related to
production, its demand level is directly related to post-earthquake demand;
on the other hand, car demand is influenced by business damage only for
the component of the demand that is directly related to business activities.
To simulate the previous observation we adopt the hypotheses that trans-
portation demand from centroid i to centroid j has a linear freight demand
reduction with business residual functionality, while light vehicles (cars) de-
mand is affect by 50% of business reduction. Further details on transporta-
tion modeling will be given in paragraph 3.7 .
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
For the transportation simulation it ha been modeled a deterministic user
equilibrium analysis; using a fixed and a variable post-earthquake demand.
In general terms the transportation problem can be divided into four main
phases: Generation  ! Distribution  ! Modal definition  ! Assignment
of transportation demand.
The Generation phase is modeled from socio-economic variables, data
about the productive system and gives, as output, the generation of zone
out-bound transportation demand.
The Distribution phase determines the attractive potential of each zone,
and determines the in-bound of transportation demand.
The output of the two phases of Generation and Distribution is the Origin-
Destination Matrix, shortened in OD matrix.
T
i
j
k
m
D
O
1
.
i
.
N
1 . j . N
T
ij
Figure 2.10: Generation of the transportation demand from node i to nodes j,k,m
(on the left), and the corresponding Tij entry on the OD matrix(on the
right).
During the Modal definiton phase the transportation demand, according to
socio-economic variable, level of service, cost functions and etc is assigned to
different modes available for the connection. This accounts for the possible
modal shift, like in the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 when commuters
shifted from car to BART system.
The last component of the analysis is Assignment of transportation demand
to the chosen network to obtain the flows in the network links.
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In analogy with economy, the transportation model can be classified ac-
cording to the three categories: Demand, Supply, Equilibrium.
￿.￿.￿ Supply model
The Topological model describes the model of the transportation network by
mean of a graph model. The Functional model describes the characteristics of
the network that complete the topological model: length of network arches,
number of lanes, free-flow speed, damage state, etc.
Figure 2.11: The definition of the Topological model from the real network charac-
teristics. Detail of the allowed and forbidden turns are inserted in a
turn penalty file.
The performance functions describe the response of one component to
demand. The level of service is modeled as follows:
 !
LS = ~f(~u,~c) (23)
where:
~LS: This model explains the performance of the network according to usage,
it’s a vector of performance functions, one per each link.
~f: general performance function.
~u: vector with the usage level.
~c: network link characteristics.
￿.￿.￿ Demand model
This set of models represent the demand of transportation in the network.
There are 6 characteristics modeled: the motivation, the origin, the destina-
tion, the frequency, the mode of transportation, the times of the trip.
~D = ~g (
 !
SE, ~A,
 !
LS) (24)
where:
~D: Demand vector as described in 2.7 .
Eg: Tijm Trips from i to j with mode m.
~SE: Socio-Economic characteristic of users.
~A: relation with the activity system in the territory.
~LS: Level of service of network elements.
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￿.￿.￿ Equilibrium models
Equilibrium models describe the interaction between the demand and the
supply. These models compute the number of trips assigned to network and
allows to calculate the flow in the arches in terms of vehicle per hour (for
private transportation)
h
veic
h
i
, passenger per hour (on public transportation)hpass
h
i
, tons of goods per hour
h
t
h
i
for goods delivery problems.
The equilibrium problem is, in general terms, the fixed-point schema:
~D = ~g [
 !
SE, ~A, ~f(~u,~c)] = ~h(
 !
SE, ~A, ~u,~c) (25)
The Network loading model allows to compute the flows in network ~u given
the trips demand ~U = ~w(~D).
~u = ~w[~h(
 !
SE, ~A, ~u,~c)] = ~q(
 !
SE, ~A, ~u,~c) (26)
The final goal of the problem is to fine the ~u that allows:
~u = ~z(~u) (27)
￿.￿.￿ Topological model
The transportation network is schematized as a direct graph such as:
G = (N,L) con L ✓ N⇥N (28)
where N is the total of nodes of which the graph is made up, L are the
couples of nodes that belong to N: the links.
nN = |N|
nL = |L|
Usually the graphs are oriented that means that the link (i, j) 6= (j, i)
￿.￿.￿ Transportation network
The network is usually represented as a very connected oriented graph in
with each link has its own cost function.
T = (N,L, FC) con L ✓ N⇥N (29)
|N| = nN
|L| = nL
|FC| = nL
One more definition is needed. On the transportation network some
nodes has a special destination, they are the Origin or the destination nodes.
From these nodes the trips start and to these nodes the trips arrive. These
nodes are called “centroids”.
Nc ⇢ N
Inside the set of links in the transportation network there’s one more sub-
set of paths. The paths are all the possible connections in one network that
allow to connect Origin to Destination.
POD ⇢ P con P = all network paths (30)
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f
c
Figure 2.12: A generic link cost function, where f is the flow on the link and c is the
cost at the given flow f. As the link gets busy the cost increases due to
mutual disturbance.
|POD| = nP
￿.￿.￿ Incidence matrix: links-paths
This is an binary matrix where the value is 1 if the link is on the path from
O to D otherwise is zero. This matrix is very sparse and usually is built
using shortest path algorithms like Dijkstra.
Let l = 1, ...,nLbe the links and k = 1, ...,nP the paths.
A with elements alk
 
1 if l 2 k
0 otherwise
(31)
The matrix is rectangular with size: A(nL⇥nP)
￿.￿.￿ Link cost functions: B.P.R.
The most common function for Deterministic User Equilibrium problem
solved with the Frank and Wolfe algorithm is one developed by B.P.R. based
on observation of flows. The general functional form is:
t = t0 ·
"
1+↵
✓
f
K
◆ #
(32)
Where:
t0 =
l
V0
Is the free flow time.
f Is the flow on the link.
K is link capacity.
Based on the first calibration of the B.P.R. in 1964 the parameters where
↵ = 0.15   = 4 with K defined as Kpratical. Nowadays the parameters
are calibrated each time using data from surveys.
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f
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Figure 2.13: The link cost function from B.P.R. as the value of capacity “K” increases,
the cost of link is more stable.
￿.￿.￿ Frank and Wolfe algorithm
In 1956 Frank and Wolfe published a minimizing algorithm that has been
efficiently used to solve the problem of assignment transportation demand
to a network [15].
The analytical solution of the problem is unfeasible due to the dimension
of the variables, but the problem can be solved using a series of successive
approximations:
~f1, . . . , ~fk-1, ~fk, ~fk+1, . . .
lim
k!1 ~fk = ~f⇤
and
8✏ > 0, ,9 n that ||~fn - ~f⇤|| 6 ✏
The algorithm can be summarized into a 5 steps procedure as described:
￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ The algorithm is started using an assignation of
type All or Nothing as starting vector.
~f1 AoN with c0l = cl(0) 8l
(Shown on fig. 2.14 a)￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ Using the last available approximation of flows
in the network each link cost is updated.
~fk with ckl = cl(flk) 8l
(Shown on fig. 2.14 b)￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ In the second step a lin-
ear approximation of the objective function is given and the effort is
to minimize it. This approximation is a hyperplane tangent to the
objective function at the point ~fk.
min
~g
h
z(~fk) + ~rz(~fk) · (~g- ~fk)
i
(33)
41
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
f
l
c
l
c
0
l
f
l
c
l
c
k
l
f
k
l
a) b)
Figure 2.14: a) Determining the cost of each link at initialization iteration, b) Deter-
mining link cost function during the cycle
with the constraints in terms of vector ~g:8>><>>:
~T = B ~G
~G > ~0
~g = A ~G
To minimize the function the constant terms are cancelled from equa-
tion (33) :
min
~g
~rz(~fk) · ~g (34)
Our objective function is the total network cost:
z(f) =
nLX
l=0
Zfl
0
cl(x) dx (35)
using the last expression the linear problem (Eq. (34) ) simplifies in:
nLX
l=1
@z( ~fk)
@fl
( ~fk) · gl =
nLX
l=1
cl(fl) · gl (36)
This optimization problem can be solved using the simplex method.
￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Along the direc-
tion of descent, a section is made with the hyperplane defined by the
descent direction vector and the vector ~dk; we find the optimum pa-
rameter that minimizes the objective function. Using a convex combi-
nation of vectors fk and gk we compute dk. At this point the direction
and length of research direction are defined:
(1-  ) ~fk +  ~gk 0 6   6 1 (37)
Using a convex combination of fk and gk the objective function is:
min
 
z
h
(1-  ) ~fk +  ~gk
i
=
nLX
l=1
Z (1- )
0
(~fk +  ~gk)cl(x) dx (38)
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The solution of the problem in equation (38) can be obtained using
the bisection method. it usually converges in 10 iterations.
dz
d 
    
k
=
nLX
l=1
⌦
cl
h
(1-  )fkl +   g
k
l
i
· (gkl - fkl )
↵
(39)
fk dk gk
Figure 2.15: Minimization procedure for optimal dk
￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ Using  k and gk from the previous step we
update the solution:
~fk+1 =  k ~g
k + (1-  k)~f
k (40)
 k decrease at each step and tends to zero.￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ At each step of the cycle evaluate if the crite-
ria is met and exit.
MCk
?
6 ✏ If TRUE exit else goto Step 1.
The following are possible measures of the convergence of the prob-
lem:
1.
MCk =
z(fk)- z(fk-1)
z(fk)
⇥ 100 (41)
2.
MCk =
LBIk
z(fk)
(42)
3.
MCk = D(fk, fk-1) (43)
D is a distance between two following approximates of the true
solution. One can use, as example, the max norm:
MCk = max
l:fkl >0
|fk+1l - f
k
l |
fkl
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Frank and Wolfe algorithm to solve deterministic user equilibrium prob-
lem has the following advantages:
• The algorithm computes directly flow of each link.
• The descent direction is computed using a AoN assignation algorithm
which is very efficient.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
During the analysis business damage levels and bridges damage levels are
needed to assess the probability of each state according to the scenario earth-
quake and to proceed with the calculation of earthquake risk. The determi-
nation of the damage level could be made using an analytical approach, but
on a practical basis this is unfeasible. Monte Carlo Method is a possible solu-
tion technique that helps in determining the bridge or the business damage
state according to the earthquake level.
￿.￿.￿ General notes on the method
In general terms Monte Carlo methods are a broad class of computational
algorithms that rely on random sampling to obtain numerical results. The
method was invented in 1940s by Stanislaw Ulam, while he was working
on nuclear weapon projects at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. It was
named, by Nicholas Metropolis to Monte Carlo Casino[24]. The main idea
of Monte Carlo Method is to estimate the mean value of the response of a
complex system using a subset of the space of the solution. The subspace is
determined sampling the original space a sufficient number of time to get
an “accurate enough” estimation of the mean value and dispersion of the
chosen variable.
A classic example of the method is the estimation of the ⇡ value using the
sampling technique.
In this bi-dimensional problem, the application of the method is to extract
a number n of casual samples of the coordinates of a point inside a square
of unitary length. Then count the number of times when the random point,
of coordinates (x,y), falls inside the circle
p
x2 + y2 6 1 of the total number
of samples.
x¯ =
Pn
i=0( i, inside)
n
(44)
 i,inside is a boolean vector variable that counts the number of times that
the random point is sampled inside the circle. The method has a good rate
of convergency, in figure 2.16 there’s a representation of the convergence
of the method using n = 1000 samples and n = 10 0000 samples.
The method was firstly introduced in the 18th century, then applied by
Enrico Fermi to determine the physical properties of the neutron and lastly
formalized during the Manhattan project by von Neumann and Ulam
In a stochastic model ✓ is the required variable.
Running the simulation, the random variable X1 is sampled such that ✓ is
the expected value of X1.
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Figure 2.16: Monte Carlo method on the estimation of ⇡ with 1000 samples (on the
left) the estimation is ⇡ = 3, 124, while with 10’000 samples (on the
right), the estimate is ⇡ = 3, 159. Each time the simulation is run, due
to its random number generation the result may slightly vary inside the
confidence boundary.
On the second iteration, a new sampled variable is given X2 with expected
value of ✓. We can perform the sampling k times, getting Xk samples with
E[Xk] = ✓.
A good estimator of ✓ can be the mean of k samples, that is:
X =
Pk
i=1 Xi
k
(45)
since it is E[X] = ✓.
In order to determine the optimal number of samples k we should make
some considerations.
Take as hypothesis that n independent random variable have the same
distribution, X1, . . . ,Xn Given  2 as the variance of Xi and ✓ the expected
value:  
E[Xi] = ✓
Var(Xi) =  
2
(46)
The sampling mean is:
X =
Pn
i=1 Xi
n
(47)
while the expected value of the sampling mean is:
E[X] =
Pn
i=1 E[Xi]
n
= ✓ (48)
Given that fact, X is a non-biased estimator of ✓. Its variance is:
Var(X) = E[(X- ✓)2] = Var
✓Pn
i=1 Xi
n
◆
=
Pn
i=1 Var(Xi)
n
=
 2
n
(49)
Follows that X is a random variable with mean value ✓ and variance  2/n,
so X is a good estimator of ✓ when  2/n is small enough. Given a specific
value of  2/n the number of n iteration to reach convergence can be derived.
We can impose that the expected value of the estimator belongs to a spe-
cific confidence interval. To prove this affirmation one can use the central
limit theorem.
Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn, . . . be a serie of random variables with mean value µ
and  2 a finite value, it follows
lim
n!1P
✓
X1,X2, . . . ,Xn,dots-nµ
 
p
n
◆
=  (x) (50)
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Where  (x) is the probability density function of normal standard vari-
able:
 (x) =
1
2
p
2⇡
Zx
-1 e
-y2
d dy (51)
if n >> 1 the central limit theorem assert that:
Z =
(X- ✓)
 p
n
(52)
has the standard normal distribution (Z ⇠ N(0, 1)). That is a mean conver-
gence of the mean value of the population.
Now we prove the fact that variance is an estimator of the convergence.
Let z↵ with 0 < ↵ < 1 and let ↵ be such that P(Z > z↵) = ↵ according to
the central limit theorem, for an n big enough
P
 
X- z(
↵
2
)
 p
n
< ✓ < X+ z(
↵
2
)
 p
n
 
= 1-↵ (53)
The equation (53) can be re-written in probabilistic terms, so the probabil-
ity that the mean is inside the following interval is:✓
X- z(
↵
2
)
 p
n
,X+ z(
↵
2
)
 p
n
◆
(54)
needs to be equal to 1-↵.
Given 1- ↵ and given the value of   one can assess the value of n. At
this point we need to determine the value the variance  2 = E[(X- ✓)2].
The sampling variance is:
S2 =
nX
i=1
(Xi -X)
2
(n- 1)
(55)
The expected value of the population variance is S2 and E[S2] =  2, it’s
true that:
nX
i=1
(Xi -X)
2 =
nX
i=1
(X2i -nX
2) (56)
from this follows:
(n- 1)E[S2] = E
"
nX
i=1
X2i
#
-n[X2] = n · E
h
X2i
i
-n[X2] (57)
In general terms, for a random variable, one have: E[Y2] = Var(Y) +
(E[Y]2) and follows:
E
h
X2i
i
= Var(Xi) + E [Xi]
2 =  2 + ✓2 (58)
and for the second part of equation:
E
h
X2
i
= Var(X) + E [X]2 =
 2
n
+ ✓2 (59)
given that, equation (57) can be re-arranged as:
(n- 1)E[S2] = n 2 +n✓2 -  2 -n✓2 = (n- 1) 2 (60)
Now, make as hypothesis that w have n independent random variables
X1,X2, . . . ,Xnwith the same probability distribution as F; now we need to
estimate the value of ✓(F), the value of PDF of F
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Let g(X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) be the estimator of ✓(F).
An estimation of the mean quadratic error is:
MSE(F) = EF[(g(X1,X2, . . . ,Xn)- ✓(F))2] (61)
In the last equation the sub-script F means that the mean value is com-
puted with respect to F distribution, that is still unknown. To estimate the
value the bootstrap technique can be used using Fe(x) as an empirical tenta-
tive distribution:
Fe(x) =
(# of i : Xi 6 x)
n
(62)
Follows the big number theory, for a n big enough with probability = 1, if
Fe(x) ! F(x) an approximate value of MSE using the bootstrap technique
is:
EQM(F) = EFe [((g(X1,X2, . . . ,Xn)- ✓(Fe))
2] (63)
The number of iteration, according to [8] can be as low as n = 10 for the
purpose of the work.
Further details on the convergence of Monte Carlo method for the specific
problem of businesses interruption will be given in paragraph 3.4.3 .
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The area chosen as testbed for the proposed procedure needs to be an area
with moderate to high seismicity, with a good industrial system, with a
complete transportation system (ranging from small municipal roads, to
highways).
Treviso has a contribution to GRP of about 20 billions of EUR, accord-
ing to Italian hazard maps it has a moderate seismicity and the transporta-
tion system has local street as well as highway like A27 Venezia–Belluno.
The system of Treviso has been described with 41 bridges, 4 business areas,
11’000 links, 630 OD nodes, 64’500 registered local businesses.
Given its characteristics, Treviso has been chosen because it satisfies the
above criteria (in figure 2.17 location of Treviso).
Figure 2.17: The test area is located on the north-east of Italy, it’s a square of roughly
40 km x 40 km.
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Before analyzing earthquake losses on distributed systems it’s needed to
compute some hazard consistent scenario earthquakes.
The first part of the works deals with the generation and filtering of sim-
ulated earthquake scenarios in terms of distribution of accelerations.
In the second part, possible earthquake losses scenarios are computed by
mean of simulation using models to relate accelerations to damages. The
simulation includes the direct losses in terms of bridges and buildings dam-
age and indirect losses due to reduced production in factory plants and
indirect losses in transportation systems due to reduced network function-
ality. In the presented work, importance sampling techniques with Monte
Carlo method are used to derive statistical data. The distribution of possible
earthquake is sampled with higher density in low probability of occurrence
and high consequences areas of the curve.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In Italy there are no publicly available scenario earthquakes, though they’re
needed to perform seismic risk risk analysis, particularly in distributed sys-
tems. INGV developed information about seismic hazard, several hazard
maps are made publicly available[12]. The INGV working group produced
9 hazard maps with different probability of occurrence and are referenced
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according to the correspondent Return Time: 30 years, 50y, 72y, 101y, 140y,
201y, 475y, 975y, 2475y.
The hazard scenarios developed by INGV have been plotted in hazard
maps and printed in tabular data made available through the institutional
website http://zonesismiche.mi.ingv.it. In figure 1.8 on page 9 is given
the 475 years map. The INGV project defined the hazard maps for each
structural frequency as shown on picture 3.1 . The hazard calculation have
a spatial resolution of 0.2” on datum ED50.
The hazard analysis are documented in technical manual that gives some
insights on background data and preliminary works to compute the hazard.
The project improved former seismogenic zoning of the italian territory to
the version named ZS9. Also the historical catalogue of past earthquake has
been updated from previous version including new earthquakes, new mag-
nitude definitions and timeframe extension to include newer earthquakes
not present in the former CPI2 catalogue. The attenuation relationships,
GMPEs, have been revised to account for the new european definition of
amax and to account the focal mechanisms according to Bommer 2003. Two
different completeness sets of data in earthquake catalogue have been de-
fined.
Figure 3.1: The representation of aggregated hazard for different structural frequen-
cies. From [12] and http://zonesismiche.mi.ingv.it
To compute earthquake hazard, the working group decided to adopt the
classic Cornell 1968 approach, because widely used in past italian projects
and in Europe.
The unavoidable background uncertainties of the methodology are ad-
dressed using a logical tree approach. The seismogenic zoning dealt with
the definition of fault location, epicentral distance, fault depth, faulting
mechanism, a particular attention was given to the definition of the zones to
allow, in a prospective work, to use regionalized attenuation relationships.
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Figure 3.2: A detail on the hazard fo Veneto region computed on a 0.5” grid in ED50
datum
The project used the relation by Ambraseys of 1996[3] and the italian
revision by Sabetta and Pugliese 1996[31] adopting the correction by Bomer
2003 for the faulting mechanism and implementing a correction factor for
near epicenter increase of earthquake response.
The completeness intervals that characterize the historical earthquake database
are defined as “CO-04.2” if the completeness is historical, while the com-
pleteness “CO-04.4” refers to statistical completeness using the Albarello
2001 methodology.
The maximum expected value of magnitude for each seismogenic zone
Mmax is stored in each seismogenic zone following definition: Mmax1 is
the “observed” maximum seismicity, that refers to historical series, while,
the Mmax2 is the safe estimation of the possible maximum magnitude.
The seismicity in time scale has been defined using the activity rate def-
inition or the Gutentberg Ricther (GR) b definition. The parameter b for
GR occurrence relationship has been defined using the historical series for
each seismic zone. On the other hand, the parameter a of GR relationship
has been assumed to be the occurrence of the Mwmin earthquake. This
guarantees the consistency of energy estimation among different zones.
The probability distribution of amax have been calculated using the code
SEISRISK III by USGS. The uncertainties have been weighted using a log-
ical tree approach for the 10% probability in 50 years reference time, i.e.
475years of return time. Given the hazard calculation for Italy, one more
step is needed to get earthquake scenarios that are suitable for seismic risk
assessment on distributed systems.
￿.￿.￿ Previous study: Sleijko and Rebez 2002
In 2002 Sleijko and Rebez published a paper on “Probabilistic seismic hazard
assessment and deterministic ground shaking scenarios for Vittorio Veneto
(N.E. Italy)”[11]. In this work the authors present some deterministic ground
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shaking scenarios for the design and the extreme earthquakes; they show
two scenarios: the most probable and the extreme one.
In figure 3.3 there’s a scenario representation using the software Seisrisk
III by USGS, using the seismogenic zones of 2002 from GNDT and three
different attenuation relationship:
• Ambraseis(1996)
• Sabetta and Pugliese(1996)
• Chiaruttini and Siro(1981)
Figure 3.3: A seismic scenario map representation from Sleijko and Rebez 2002[11].
￿.￿.￿ Previous study: Peresan et al. 2009
In 2009 Peresan et al. published a work on “Neo deterministic seismic haz-
ard scenarios for North Eastern Italy” [28]. In this work the authors pre-
sented a novel approach, defined neo–deterministic for the simulation of
earthquake scenarios associated with the alarm on the Adria region. Us-
ing prediction algorithms like CN, MS8 and PULSYN software by Gusev
(2008) the authors get ahead classical statistical approaches using historical
earthquakes, and run f.e. simulation from seismic nodes to get the sce-
nario earthquakes. Seismic nodes are the classic seismogenic sources but
also the nodes that arise from geological structural analysis. According to
the paper, if no historical data is available classical statistic approaches can
under–estimate the actual hazard because of lack of data.
￿.￿.￿ Proposed methodology
Since there are no available de–aggregated seismic scenarios to perform SRA
on distributed systems a broader area needs to be covered with sufficient
detail for the purpose of simulation of earthquake consequences.
To compute the seismic losses scenarios the distribution of acceleration is
needed in the study area.
The proposed methodology require 6 steps:
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values of displacement, velocity and acceleration, or
any other parameter of interest for seismic engineer-
ing) caused by the potential sources contained in a
seismogenic node. Figure 9 shows the DGA scenar-
ios associated with the two considered nodes. The
peak values of displacement and velocity are pro-
vided in Table 6.
The node D15, recognized prone to magni-
tude C 6.0 earthquakes, is the node that supplies
the highest values for Trieste, even if two nodes with
MN C 6.5, D14 (analyzed in PERESAN et al., 2009)
and D16 are detected in the vicinity (GORSHKOV et al.,
2004). In fact, D15 is the node closest to the city and
its hazard is controlled by the smoothing operation,
which assigns a magnitude 6.5 to some sources inside
the node. For Nimis we choose the node D1
(recognized prone for both MN C 6.0 and
MN C 6.5) because it includes the 1976 Friuli
earthquake epicenter (6.5.1976; M = 6.4, CPTI04,
GASPERINI et al., 2004), which strongly hit the town of
Nimis, and no other nearby node is capable to
generate, for Nimis, values greater than those shown
in Table 6.
A quantitative validation of the results obtained
with the integrated approach is performed, based on
the accelerograms recorded during the 1976 Friuli
earthquake and following an approach similar to
that used in PANZA et al., (2001). The position of
the recording stations is shown in Fig. 9b. The hori-
zontal accelerations recorded during the earthquake
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Figure 7
Map of design ground acceleration (DGA) associated to an alarm in the Adria region. The minimum value reported in the map is 0.01 g
598 A. Peresan et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
Figure 3.4: Map of design ground acceleration (DGA) associated to an alarm in the
Adria region. From Peresan et al. 2009 [28]
1. Retrieve ata for seismogenic sources;
2. Adapt and imp rt data on seismogen c sources;
3. Compute the distribution of the chosen intensity parameter at the re-
quired locations using an attenuation relationship, GMPE;
4. Generate a set of possible epicenters;
5. Create the scenario using the desired intensity measure;
6. Filter scenarios to reproduce the hazard of the area.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Seismogenic sources
Figure 3.5: Historical earth-
quakes from CPTI.
There are two definition of seismogenic ar-
eas available: the DISS catalogue and the
catalogue from INGV project ZS9. DISS cat-
alogue has been composed by INGV Work-
ing group and it’s updated to version 3.1.1.
The ZS9 catalogue has been developed dur-
ing the seismic hazard project funded by
Civil Protection Agency.
Both options have been analyzed and the
ZS9 has been used in the present applica-
tion because of the completeness of data to
perform probabilistic analysis.
“Zone Sismiche ZS9”
The ZS9 seismogenic sources definition has
been derived from the parametric cata-
logue of historical earthquakes up to 2002.
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This catalogue stores all the known earthquakes from year 217BC to year
2002 AD. In figure 3.5 is presented a plot on the map of all epicenters
of historical earthquake contained in the catalogue. The working group
classified the italian territory in six macro–zones following the tectonic and
geologic homogeneity, accounting for the different rupture mechanism as
described in (Montone et al.,2003). In figure 3.6 a) there’s a representation
of the seismogenic zones from the ZS9 catalogue, fig. Figure 3.6 b) repre-
sents the comparison of zones from ZS9 and DISS version 2.0. ZS9 zones are
wider than the DISS counterpart; ZS9 generally fully include DISS zones.
Gruppo di Lavoro per la redazione della mappa di pericolosità sismica (Ordinanza PCM 20.03.03, n.3274) 
 Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia  
 
Rapporto conclusivo (bozza), aprile 2004 12  
Criteri. Con riferimento ai requisiti a), b) e c) gli aspetti innovativi riguardano:  
 
i) il completo riferimento delle ZS dell’Appennino alle direttrici longitudinali;  
ii) l’introduzione di ZS Est-Ovest nell’area dell’avampaese apulo, riferite a fasci di 
lineamenti tettonici attivi dotati di cinematica prevalente trascorrente;  
iii) l’introduzione di una fascia di intensa deformazione nel Tirreno meridionale, 
responsabile di parte della sismicità che interessa la costa tirrenica della Sicilia; 
iv) la scelta di privilegiare le proposte del citato progetto SESAME per le zone di 
confine, previo adattamento alle ZS individuate in Italia; 
v) l’assunzion  che in tutte le are  che non ricadono i  ZS sia comunque possibile il 
verificarsi di eventi con Mwmax=5.0, derivante dalla constatazione che eventi di 
energia bassa e intermedia si sono verificati in diverse aree. 
 
In fig.9 ZS9 è posta a confronto co  il contenuto informativo di DISS 2.0, aggiornato 
con i risultati più recenti ottenuti nell’ambito di vari progetti tra cui il già citato 
progetto GNDT “Terremoti probabili....” (che verranno pubblicati entro la fine del 2004 
nel DISS 3.0); in fig.10 con la zonazione del progetto SESAME (Jiménez et al., 2001).  
 
 
 
Figura 9. Zonazione sismogenetica ZS9 a confronto con le sorgenti sismogenetiche 
contenute nel database DISS 2.0 (Valensise e Pantosti, 2001) e relativi aggiornamenti 
fino al novembre 2003. 
a) b)
Figure 3.6: a) Seismogenic zones using the ZS9 definit on, inside the red box the
testbed area. b) The comparison of ZS9 definite with DISS seismogenic
zones.
￿.￿.￿ Recurrence law
During the INGV research projects for each seismogenic zone “a” and “b”
parameters for Gutenberg-Richter relationship were derived. The functional
form of the equation is:
log  m = a- b ·m (64)
where:
 m mean annual rate of occurrence of EQs with magnitude m.
10a mean yearly number of earthquakes; the a value is deter-
mined with a rate o Mwmin = 4.8Mw to be consistent with
the energy content of the samples from the historical earth-
quakes database.
b relative likelihood of large and small earthquakes.
Since earthquakes energy follows an exponential distribution with mag-
nitude, magnitude linear space is converted into a logarithmic space and is
linearly sampled from 4.8 to the maximum magnitude for each source. In
table 3.1 for each source are given the estimation of b, a and the maximum
estimated magnitude are computed from data of INGV project. Figure 3.7
shows the recurrence relationships of two zones one interest for the current
application. The mean value of earthquake of a certain magnitude  M is
important because it defines the probability of each seismic scenario.
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ZS Name ZS9 b b MwMax a a
Co-04.2 Co-04.4 GR (Co.04.2) (Co.04.4)
Ts–Monte Nevoso 904 -1.12 -1.32 6.14 4.52 5.29
Friuli–Veneto W 905 -1.06 -1.12 6.60 4.66 4.91
Garda–Veronese 906 -1.14 -1.70 6.60 4.51 7.06
Bergamasco 907 -1.71 -1.48 6.14 6.81 5.88
Table 3.1: Seismogenic zones recurrence rate parameters
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Figure 3.7: Recurrence relationship for seismogenic zones 905 and 906 the ones in
the interest area.
￿.￿.￿ Attenuation relationships
Attenuation relationship, also called ground motion prediction equations
(GMPE) are a model to relate input parameters (p.e. the distance from epi-
center/ipocenter, the magnitude of the earthquake, the soil type and others)
can predict the value of an intensity measure of the seismic action (PGA,
PGD, Sa, etc). In literature several attenuation relationships are available
for the italian earthquakes. In the present work we present the three more
interesting for the sake of this study.
The classical Ambraseys 1996 [3] is the most diffused, but this equation
has been calibrated using data from all europe, so this could be not accurate
enough. Another option, one of the most recent, is Bindi et al. 2011[5], the
functional form is rather similar to Ambrasys; but in 1996 the first GMPE for
Italy appeared, by Sabetta and Pugliese[31]. In this case the functional form
is identical to Ambraseys but has been calibrated on italian earthquakes, it
has been widely used and tested.
In the present study Sabetta and Pugliese attenuation relationship has been
chosen.
Sabetta and Pugliese 1996
The Sabetta and Pugliese attenuation relationship published in 1996 has the
following functional form:
log10(Y) = a+ b ·M+ c · log10(R2 + h2)1/2 + e1 · S1 + e2 · S2 ±   (65)
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where:
Y Response parameter as (PGA[g], PGV[cm/s], PV)
M Magnitude of the earthquake as [Mw]
R epicentral distance in [km]
S1,2 dummy variable used to account the soil type
  standard deviation of logarithm of Y
The parameters for Sabetta and Pugliese 1996 are derived from table 3.2 .
In figure 3.8 the plot of the GMPE Sabetta and Pugliese 1996 for the mag-
nitude range of interests and calibrated distance.
Const. Term Magnitude Distance Site 1 Site 2
a b c e1 e2 h  
-1.845 0.363 -1 0.195 0 5.0 0.190
Table 3.2: Coefficients to be used in Sabetta and Pugliese 1996 for PGA for horizon-
tal component and epicentral distance.
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Figure 3.8: Plot of the chosen attenuation relationship(GMPE) from Sabetta and
Pugliese 1996 [31].
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This paragraph details the procedure to generate seismic scenarios.
The procedure starts acquiring some data about the seismogenic zones,
about the bridges and businesses that are under analysis. In figure 3.14 red
points represent the bridges in transportation network; in blue the centroids
of the productive areas. The procedure, if data is available, can be extended
to finer level of detail modeling each business instead of business areas,
giving a finer representation of the risk, especially for insurance industry
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purposes. This allows to get a better estimation of risk in terms of direct
and indirect losses related to each entry in portfolio.
The algorithm randomly samples points inside seismogenic areas with
a pre–defined number of possible epicenter. The sampling is uniform in-
side each area. In the present application for each seismogenic zone 500
epicenters are simulated, in figure 3.9 the epicenters generated for each seis-
mogenic source.
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Figure 3.9: The simulated epicenters plotted as red points on the map over the seis-
mogenic zones.
For each epicenter, the distance of each locations (i.e. bridges and pro-
ductive areas) is computed and stored into a vector. The distances that are
bigger 120 km (the interval of definition of the GMPE) are deleted, because
beyond the range of applicability. The space of possible magnitudes is trans-
formed in an exponential space in order to be uniformly sampled. The sam-
ples of magnitudes used in the current application are: [4.80 5.37 6.00 6.72 7.50].
A consistent number scenario earthquakes is generated. The total number
of scenarios is filtered according to the procedure shown on paragraph 3.3.1
to get an accurate representation of hazard with a smaller number of scenar-
ios. Since following transportation analyses nested in Monte Carlo method
are time–consuming the number of scenarios needs to be reduced.
The proposed algorithm has been coded using Matlab environment[23].
In the following lines the pseudo–code of the proposed algorithm is pre-
sented:
Listing 3.1: The pseudo code for scenario generation algorithm
Foreach source
Random generate n ep i cen t e r s
Foreach ep i cen te r
Foreach magnitude
Foreach lo ca t i on ( Br idge , Business )
Compute PGA @locat ions
Discard i f too low
End
End
End
End
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Cluster and !lter 
scenarios 
Earthquake scenario 
Attenuation 
Bindi (2011) Sabetta Pugliese (1996) ZS9 related 
Source model 
Diss ZS9 
 Main procedure 
a) b)
Figure 3.10: a) The proposed algorithm for the seismic scenario generation. b)
A screenshot of the tool to generate seismic scenarios simulating a
shakemap with epicenter in Montebelluna-Montereale, simulating max-
imum magnitude for the source: M =6.5.
￿.￿.￿ Filtering scenarios
To be accurate enough, the simulation of earthquake scenarios produces a
big number of simulations. Since the following Monte Carlo method has
a nested Frank and Wolfe algorithm on a very detailed network (that is
very time consuming by its nature), a selection of the computed scenarios is
needed.
The idea is to chose a fixed number of scenarios, to reduce the compu-
tational workload of the subsequent phases. The remaining scenarios need
to be consistent for hazard description. The conceptual scheme of the pro-
posed procedure is shown in figure 3.10 a).
The proposed selection procedure computes the distance of each scenario
as the distance of each scenario acceleration from each specific hazard curve.
For each analyzed location the hazard curve from the INGV [12] is derived.
Earthquake scenarios are clustered according to their probability of occur-
rence, that follows from the occurrence relationship.
For each location, the distance from the hazard curve of the specific loca-
tion and the simulated scenario acceleration is computed and stored into a
matrix.
The distance matrix represent in its rows the vector of the distance from
hazard curve for each bridge, in its columns the distance for each scenario.
The distance is then computed as the Euclidean norm of the columns of ma-
trix D. For each cluster only the first 5 scenarios are chosen, i.e. the closest
5 scenarios for each cluster; in figure 3.12 a representation of the selection
process. From table 3.3 in the present simulation: from the 8 0000 scenar-
ios (in figure 3.9 are represented the generated epicenters), 6 magnitudes ·
2 sources · 5 selected scenarios = 60 have been selected.
The scenario selected with the presented procedure are in good accor-
dance with the hazard for the same location derived from previous works
as can be noted from the following figure 3.13 where the scenarios accelera-
tions are plotted over the hazard curves for two different locations for sake
of comparison.
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Variable #
Sources 2
Epicenter 8 source 2
Magnitude classes 8
Table 3.3: Variables to be permuted to obtain all possible combinations of scenarios
SCNsel(i)|#(sqrt(HAZ2loc - SCN
2
loc,Pri)) < n8Pri 8locations (66)
where:
SCNdel(i) The i-th selected scenarios
HAZloc Hazard at location loc
SCNloc,Pri Scenario acceleration at location SCNloc,Pri for
earthquake scenario
n number of scenarios to be selected per each cluster
Pri Probability of i-th clusters, derived from (64)
locations all the locations included in the analysis.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
distance for each scenario. The distance is then computed as the Euclidean
norm of the columns of matrix D. For each cluster only the first 5 scenarios
are chosen, i.e. the closest 5 scenarios for each cluster.
asd (59)
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Figure 3.12: In the figure is represented the hazard curve in red for a particular
location, in this case bridge # 1 location, blue the points represent all
the accelerations from each seismic scenarios.
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Figure 3.11: In the figure is represented the hazard curve in red for a particular
location, in this case Bridg # 1 location, blue the points represent all
the accelerations from each seismic scenarios.
In figure 3.11 , for a specific location(in this case the location correspond-
ing to bridge #1) in red is presented the hazard curve derived from hazard
maps of the INGV project; blue circles represent the acceleration simulated
using the proposed procedure. Data is scattered because of two reasons.
The first: the location of the epicenters can be close or far from the loca-
tion inspected, this produces the scattering in the horizontal direction of
blue points. The other noticeable difference is that some series are more
scattered, while other series are less scattered along horizontal axis. This
follows directly from the definition of seismogenic areas. Zone 906, the west-
ern one, doesn’t intersect any location; because of the distance the distance
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of each epicenter to locations is less variable, and this reduces the scattering.
Earthquakes simulated from source 905, that intersect locations, are more
scattered because there are more possible configuration of the epicenters
that can be very close and very far from the location. The last observation
is that the scattering increase with intensity of the earthquake (intensity can
be derived from the probability of the earthquake because is directly related
to magnitude).
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
5 · 10-3
1 · 10-2
1.5 · 10-2
2 · 10-2
2.5 · 10-2
3 · 10-2
3.5 · 10-2
PGA [m/s2]
Pr
(S
ce
na
ri
o
#)
[-
]
Accelerations for bridge #1 clustered by Pr(scenario#) - Filtered
Prob 3.15e-04
Prob 4.17e-04
Prob 8.36e-04
Prob 1.07e-03
Prob 2.11e-03
Prob 2.62e-03
Prob 5.07e-03
Prob 6.13e-03
Prob 1.17e-02
Prob 1.37e-02
Prob 2.57e-02
Prob 2.94e-02
Hazard curve
Figure 3.13
53
Figure 3.12: For location Bridge #1 the hazard curve is represented in red, all scenar-
ios are represented with gray dots, the chosen scenarios are represented
with colored dot according to their cluster.
In figure 3.12 , for a specific location (for sake of comparison with pre-
vious observations, location bridge#1 is chosen) the hazard curve is repre-
sented as a red line, while scenarios are represented as colored dots. Under
each colored series there are gray dots that correspond to un–selected scenar-
ios. As expected, selected scenarios, are the closest to hazard curve. Some
scenarios are closer while other are little more far because this is a specific
location, while the selection method is, actually, reducing the “global error”
of difference of all scenarios at each an every location, instead of the “local
error” that can be seen looking at the figure that depicts only one location
at time.
Since the accordance is made to minimize the global error that could be
done when reducing the number of scenarios that represent that hazard,
from figure 3.13 a) can be seen that the mean acceleration, computed as
the mean of the acceleration of all scenarios that belong to one cluster, is
fitting properly the hazard curve also for different locations. In figure 3.13 is
presented the fitting of two locations, that are far away in space. Following
the proposed methodology, for each location the specific hazard curve is
plotted and the respective selected scenario accelerations are plotted.
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Figure 3.13: For location Bridge #1 the hazard curve is represented in red, all scenar-
ios are represented with gray dots, the chosen scenarios are represented
with colored dot according to their cluster.
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Figure 3.14: The picture represents the mean value of each selected scenario for the
location corresponding to Bridge #1. There’s good accordance between
the presented hazard curve and the scenario accelerations.
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Figure 3.13: For location Bridge #1 the hazard curve is represented in red, all scenar-
ios are represented with gray dots, the chosen scenarios are represented
with colored dot according to their cluster.
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Figure 3.14: The picture represents the mean value of each selected scenario for the
location corresponding to Bridge #1. There’s good accordance between
the presented hazard curve and the scenario accelerations.
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Figure 3.13: The picture represents the mean value of each selected scenario for the
locations corresponding to Bridge #1 a d Bridge #31. The pictu e show
a good accordance between the presented hazard curve and the selected
scenario accelerations.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The main topic of analysis in the present work, and the most innovative
approach to the problem of the loss of production is based on the definition
of residual productive capacity after an earthquake.
0 10 20 30 40    50 km10
 11.5° E  12.0° E  12.5° E 
 45.0° N 
 45.5° N 
 46.0° N 
Figure 3.14: The exposed risks. Red triangles
are the bridges location, the blue
squares the productive areas loca-
tions, the underling yellow areas
are the seismogenic sources.
To approach the problem
some assumption have been
made. The first hypothesis
is that residual productivity of
a business is directly related
to the damage of its build-
ings. This hypothesis can be
improved taking into account
that the building isn’t the only
responsible for production, but
the human workforce plays a
key role along with the resid-
ual functionality of plants, ma-
chineries and availability of ma-
terials.
Should be noted that if the
business is big enough to have
different production sites, activ-
ities could be relocated in plants
un-affected by the earthquake.
The proposed model doesn’t ac-
count that at the present stage
of development. In figure 3.14
the productive zones analyzed
are shown in blue squares.
The second hypothesis is connected with the economical description of
the problem. It is assumed that each industrial facility has no relation with
other business. To remove this hypothesis an economical model should be
developed to account possible damages to supply chain and model the so–
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called “inter-ripple” effect, i.e. the supply of materials can be shortened or
the buyer can experience damage itself and reduce its demand.
Derived loss of functionality can be derived from the shortage in supply
of basic services, e.g. electrical power or water. The present model accounts
the relation to transportation system.
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Figure 3.15: The picture represents the conceptual schema of damage to productive
system. The computes the state of damage using fragility curves, resid-
ual functionality is obtained using a model for the loss of functionality.
The residual productivity is obtained. The module outputs can be used
for different uses.
The conceptual schema for the assessment of loss of productivity and
loss of GRP is presented in figure 3.15 . This module of analysis accepts
as input a measure of the intensity of the earthquake at each productive
location. The module compute damage state using the provided fragility
curves. Then, residual functionality is accounted using a model for the loss
of functionality. Further, residual productivity is obtained from the model
that relates the residual functionality of the building to the ability to produce
revenue. At the end of run the module outputs can be used for many uses.
The loss of functionality of a building or a productive area can be assessed.
Using economic data the model can predict the loss of gross regional
product. It can be used for a subsequent analysis of the recovery process
adding a recovery description module. Economic data can be used for the
estimation of the reconstruction cost and to perform a Benefit-Cost analysis
if dealing with government aids.
The estimation of direct and indirect losses can be useful for portfolio
management in insurance market. Results can also be used to explore new
areas of business for emerging catastrophe insurance market.
In formal terms the model is:
BD = f(PR,RR, FR,E) (67)
where:
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BD is Business Damage of a productive area of any size (from small
business to aggregated macro-productive area)
PR is the residual productivity after earhquake
RF is Residual Functionality
F is the fragility of building
E the earthquake,i.e. the input.
The economic data to perform the analysis has be retrieved from the Data
Warehouse of Istat (Italian statistical institute.) Four districts have been con-
sidered to perform the economic analysis: Conegliano, Montebelluna, Pieve
di Soligo and Treviso. In table 3.4 are given the details of the number of
businesses per each productive district and the relative contribution to the
Gross Regional Product (GRP). Since GRP data is provided of each produc-
tive district, for the purpose of the present work it has been considered that
each business has a unitary contribution to the GRP and the rate of contri-
bution to GRP is directly the rate of business of the district when related to
the total of businesses in the region.
ID District Businesses Rate GRP (EUR)
152 Conegliano 16’572 3.73% 11’604’009’825.61
153 Montebelluna 11’913 2.68% 8’341’694’970.59
154 Pieve di Soligo 4’124 0.93% 2’887’698’317.69
155 Treviso 32’017 7.20% 22’418’874’160.43
Sum 64’626 19.22% 59’835’013’735.12
Regional total 444’578 100.00% 311’301’441’000.00
Table 3.4: Productive system data representation. In italic data from Istat. Other
data is computed from the previous.
￿.￿.￿ Fragility curves
As stated in the second chapter, the description of fragility in this applica-
tion to define residual functionality of productive plants, is founded on the
description of the fragility of industrial areas.
Figure 3.16: A tilt up building during its con-
struction.
In this application we assume
that the fragility of each pro-
ductive area is represented by
the fragility of the most com-
mand industrial building, in
this application, of the area of
Treviso, a tilt-up wall pre-cast
concrete building has been as-
sumed. Another assumption is
made, since the earthquake sce-
nario has no directionality, the
response of the structural sys-
tem is a-directional.
The fragility of the industrial building is described using the fragility
curves from Hazus.[2]
These type of building has a wood or a metal deck roof diaphragm. Usu-
ally, walls are thin, while the roofs are relatively light. They are designed
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using older or non-seismic codes, that gives a poor seismic performance be-
cause the buildings have inadequate or no-connections. The typical height
of tilt-up buildings is one or two stories. Walls can have numerous openings
to give the access trough doors, to allow room for windowing, etc.
The functional form of the fragility curve of industrial buildings is:
P[ds|PGA] =  

1
 ds
ln
✓
PGA
PGAd,ds
◆ 
(68)
Where:
 ds is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of PGA of
damage state, ds, assumed as 0.64
  is the standard cumulative log-normal distribution function
PGAd,ds is the PGA that denies the mean value of each damage state
given in table 3.5 .
The hypothesis of the fragility curve derived from Hazus are:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ the building is assumed to be designed according to the
building code for a moderate seismicity zone.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ to be consistent with the previous module the in-
tensity measure chosen is PGA￿￿￿￿￿￿ The method for building fragility curves is “Equivalent PGA”￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ According to the source the type of building id “PC1”
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Figure 3.17: The fragility curve used to describe the seismic response of industrial
buildings.
The four damage states in figure 3.17 correspond to:￿￿￿￿￿￿ Hairline cracks of the walls, minor concrete spalling;￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Wall surface exhibits diagonal cracks; Some welded panel con-
nections may have been broken;￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Through-the-wall diagonal cracks; Extensive spalling.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Structure is collapsed or in imminent danger of collapse; 15% of
buildings with complete damage are expected to be collapsed.
Damage state Mean value
“Slight” 0.18
“Moderate” 0.24
“Extensive” 0.44
“Complete” 0.71
Table 3.5: The residual functionality model.
The fragility of industrial buildings could also be represented using a f.e.
simulation of the non linear response of the industrial building, starting
from a plastic SDOF structural model to a detailed and complex non lin-
ear model to account the weak connection of the building. Several studies
have been published in this field; the only counter effect of this choice is
the increase of computational time because of high demanding resource f.e.
analyses.
In present work the earthquake direction is not accounted because of the
novel approach to the problem. Future works can apply the concept of direc-
tionality to the simulation of earthquake scenarios implementing a complex
f.e. simulation of the soil behavior after the release of energy by the quake.
So, a future work can use this data to improve the response of buildings
accounting the directionality of the response of the structural system in 3
directions.
￿.￿.￿ Residual functionality
At this stage, damage stateDS are available, but a model is needed to obtain
the residual functionality RF of industrial facility.
RF = f(DS) (69)
To relate the damage state to residual functionality has been proposed a
step model. The model express the fact that an undamaged business has
no productivity reductions, if there’s a slight damage the loss of productiv-
ity is 20% because some minor repairs are needed. If the damage state is
moderate, the loss of productivity is of 60%. When the damage state is ex-
tensive, the residual productivity is about 20%, considering that some parts
of the production plant can still be sound, while other are unavailable. If
the building is collapsed no production is possible, the residual functional-
ity is 0. Following previous observation the calibration parameters for the
Residual Functionality model adopted are: ↵ = 0.80 ,  = 0.40 and   = 0.20.
The proposed model can be calibrated with historical data, if available.
The model is discrete, but can be easily converted into a continuous model,
if there’s enough data for a proper calibration. Data could be retrieved from
historical earthquakes in areas with homogeneous characteristics.
A parametric study can be done to assess the influence of proposed tenta-
tive parameters calibration.
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Damage state RF
1 “No damage” 1.0
2 “Slight” ↵
3 “Moderate”  
4 “Extensive”  
5 “Collapse” 0.0
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
DS
R
F
Table 3.6: Residual functionality model. The residual functionality model has been
applied using: ↵ = 0.80 ,  = 0.40 and   = 0.20
￿.￿.￿ Computing Business damage scenario
As seen in paragraph 3.4.1 fragility curves are described in probabilistic
form, to compute the damage scenario they need to be randomly sampled
in correspondence of accelerations coming from the earthquake simulation
module, cfr. figure 3.17 . We decided to adopt the Monte Carlo method to
sample the fragility curves of each industrial facility and obtain the corre-
sponding mean value of Damage State DS.
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Figure 3.18: Converge plot form Monte Carlo method of the definition of residual
functionality. In the graph is represented the first earthquake scenario
for business area #1. Iterations range from 10 to 100 0000.
An explorative convergence study on Monte Carlo method for the spe-
cific problem has been performed using one seismic scenario. The resulting
convergence plot is presented in figure 3.18 . According to the convergence
plot, residual functionally settles to the value of RF = 0.32 with 400 itera-
tions, while the error bar, that accounts for dispersion is almost stable. With
a very small number of iterations, i.e. 4 and 40, the method isn’t able to
represent the variability of the problem. With 100 iterations the solution is
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oscillatory, but finally with 400 iteration is reasonably stable with compari-
son to computational time.
The application of Monte Carlo method is presented in figure 3.19 as
a box plot of the error bars vs each computed scenario. The variability
expressed in the application is related to the scatter in the input scenario
accelerations, due to spatial variability caught by the model.
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Figure 3.19: Computed residual functionality with Monte Carlo method using 400
iterations.
The risk has been computed in terms of reduction of functionality. Risk,
as business damage, is defined as 1- RF. in figure 3.20 the risk curve of
the the Industrial area #1 is presented. As expected more rare events induce
higher damage: an event with probability 3.0 · 10-2 causes a business dam-
age almost negligible, while the rarer event with 3.0 · 10-4 probability, that
means higher earthquake magnitude, implies a damage bigger than 0.8.
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Figure 3.20: Risk curve in terms of business damage vs the probability of scenario.
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￿.￿.￿ Indirect economic losses
It’s interesting to compute how the earthquake affects the economic capacity
of the affected region. This is done relating the residual productive capacity
to the gross regional product. The residual gross product is the product of
the residual functionality times the un–affected gross regional product.
Loss = RF⇥GRP0 (70)
where:
Loss Economic indirect losses from current scenario due
to diminished production;
RF Residual Functionality of industrial zone due to
earthquake damage;
GRP0 Reference Gross Regional Product contribution be-
fore earthquake.
Using equation (70) from the residual functionality the indirect economic
loss is computed. In figure 3.21 the “Indirect losses” due to earthquake
damage to industrial facilities are plotted. According to simulation, the
earthquake with an occurrence probability of 3.0 · 10-4 in the productive
area #1 reduces the GRP contribution to 3.76B EUR. While earthquake with
higher annual probability of occurrence, i.e. 3.0 · 10-2, leave practically un–
affected the productivity with a loss of 3%. In figure 3.22 the risk curve for
the entire analyzed region is presented. The curve is made using an interpo-
lation of data from the scenario analyses using 400 Monte Carlo iterations.
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.Figure 3.21: The first productive zone risk curve. The green line on the righthand
side is the contribution of the zone to GRP, i.e. 22.4B EUR
The same analysis of residual productivity is done on the 4 productive
zones. The reduced productivity is generated with the same method, i.e.
the residual functionality of each zone is the linear responsible for GRP
reduction, given its contribution as in table 3.4 . Figure 3.22 presents the risk
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curve of the region obtained as a cubic regression on the plane of logarithm
of probabilities (y-axis) and economic losses (x-axis).
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Figure 3.22: The risk curve of the residual GRP after the earthquake.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The post earthquake scenarios exhibits many societal changes. The state
government and the civil protection agencies immediately start to help the
hit population, while lifeline managers start their emergency procedures to
recover as soon as possible all the facilities. Engineers start their work to
assess the structural health of buildings and infrastructures.
In the immediate post event, the structure of society changes to adapt
itself to a new urban configuration. After the first shock, people are moved
in temporary shelters until their houses are assessed for structural safety.
If reconstruction in the same area is not feasible, new settlement areas are
identified and residential building are constructed.
The same happens to buildings that are used for production. According to
the size of the activity some parts of production can be dislocated in differ-
ent areas of the plant or relocated in different plants; while other activities,
that are not strong enough to support the treat may go out of business.
In general terms the reconstruction process is a key feature of the new ar-
rangement of the area. Reconstruction is a pricey and very time consuming
operation.
The challenge of the work is to simulate this recovery transitory when the
building stock goes back to pre-earthquake situation or moves to a different
configuration. Here we try to simulate the process from the engineering
point of view by looking at the macro-economical effects of this process.
The simulation is a challenging task because several elements need to
be accounted. The economic system is complex, each business is related
to others in a multi connected network. Forward link connection can be
damaged, this is a supply damage. On the other hand, the consume link
can experience damage, this is a backward damage.
Other effects are financial, one should account the borrowing cost of capi-
tals needed for reconstruction or economic aids from government agencies.
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A very delicate relationship is between the businesses and the transporta-
tion system. It can happen that a demand surge because of the reconstruc-
tion process completely changes the behavior.
To simulate this complex process some hypotheses are assumed:
• The external financial aids impact the reconstruction process reducing
the reconstruction time.
• In the present work, as a first step to explore the connection with
the transportation system connection we will assume some hypothesis
shown in further paragraph 3.7 .
• Since the change in time of demand is hard to simulate, it has been as-
sumed that future profits account for the grout of money de–valuation,
i.e. the annual borrow cost is assumed to be 0%.
The model assumes that at the beginning it takes more time for indus-
trial facilities to recover from an earthquake. On the long run, i.e. several
years after the earthquake, all business recover to 100% of pre-earthquake
functionality.
The model could be improved using a micro-economy model to account
all the relation between businesses both inside the study area and outside.
In figure 3.23 there is a plot of the proposed model for recovery, in case
of absence of external ids (a) and if external financial aids are given (b).
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Figure 3.23: a) The proposed recovery model in case of absence of external aids.
b) The proposed recovery model with financial aids.
￿.￿.￿ Recovery model
The recovery model should account the residual functionality after earth-
quake, the possible external financial aid from government agencies, and
the relation with different societal systems.
Observing past catastrophes it can be seen that, in the immediate post-
event, it takes some times to restart the business.
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One more observation, entrepreneurs that are waiting for financial aids,
usually, delay the reconstruction process when the aids are available, instead
of financing the process borrowing capitals from banks.
The proposed model follows a cumulative lognormal distribution with a
fixed value for dispersion of 0.9 and a mean value according to table 3.7 :
RFr =
1
2
erfc

-
ln t- µ
 
p
2
 
(71)
where:
RFr residual functionality recovery
t is the time starting from day 0 (earthquake)
ercf complementary error function
µ and   as in table 3.7 .
Residual functionality Mean Mean Std. deviation
(w/o aids) (w/ aids)
0.8 < RF < 1.0 4 4 0.9
0.4 < RF < 0.8 30 30 0.9
0.2 < RF < 0.4 120 60 0.9
0.0 < RF < 0.2 360 ⇤ 2 360 0.9
Table 3.7: Chosen parameters for simulation of the reconstruction process.
The simulation in time domain has been run starting from the earthquake
scenarios. In figure 3.24 the recovery process is represented. The intersec-
tion between the line without aids(in black) and the line with aids(in red)
represent the break-event point in time domain for the worthiness of finan-
cial aids. The same analysis can be done considering the economic process
as in figure 3.25 .
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
time [days]
E
(F
C
T
|P
G
A
)
Recovery of Business after earthquake
Figure 3.24: The curves represent the recovery process in term of residual function-
ality vs. time. The black line represent the recovery process with no
external financial aids, the red curve with external financial aids.
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Figure 3.25: The production during the recovery process expressed in terms of eco-
nomic losses some representatives earthquake scenarios.
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The integral of curve in figure 3.25 is the Gross Regional Product. The
difference with baseline is the indirect loss due to earthquake.
GRPeq =
Ztend
t0
RP dt (72)
Losses = GRPref -GRPeq (73)
where:
GRP Gross Regional Product, with subscript “ref” it
refers to baseline, with subscript “eq” it refers to
post-earthquake conditions.
t0 is day–zero the day of earthquake
tend day when the economy goes back to “normal” con-
dition
RP is the residual productivity
Losses are the indirect losses due to earthquake.
Given the assumption in table 3.8 , an estimation of the reconstruction
cost from with follows the amount of state aids as of the form:
Aids = Surf⇥ #Buildgs⇥ RecCost⇥ (1- RF) (74)
where:
Aids Total amount of predicted government aids
Surf mean surface per building
#Buildgs number of building in analysis zone
RecCost unitary reconstruction cost
(1- RF) Damage entity as complement to 1 of Residual func-
tionality.
An application of proposed procedure follows showing the results of the
analysis for the zone # 1: Treviso.
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Parameter Value
Square footage per building 1000 m2/building
Number of building # of businesses
Reconstruction cost 150EUR/m2
Table 3.8: default
In zone #1 Treviso there are 20’826 industrial buildings. Figure 3.26
presents the contribution of the productive zone #1 to GRP under differ-
ent scenario earthquakes. The difference between the black and white sets
of bars is the increase in production when financial aids are given.
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Figure 3.26: Contribution to GRP of the productive area #1: Treviso in two hypothe-
ses of financial aids, and without. The difference between the two set
of bars is the positive contribution of financial aids.
Under current hypotheses the financial aids helps to get a increase of 2.7
billions of EUR in 2 years of analysis, as shown in figure 3.27 . The break-
even point for the reconstruction cost is 225 EUR/m2. The reconstruction
cost is a key value in the decision process because the general profitability of
the operation is strictly related to this assumption. In that area the value of
225 EUR/m2 is quite low for industrial building. This observation suggest
that unitary reconstruction cost must be accurately defined.
Although further researches are needed, it appears that the government
financial help, from the societal point of view helps to reduce the the losses
of gross regional product induced by earthquakes.
The transferring the risk to the insurance market can be profitable for the
state because it helps in saving 2.8 billion of EUR of financial aids.
It’s important to remember that the present analysis doesn’t account the
positive externalities of the operation, like the feeling of security of popula-
tion, the increase of jobs offers, etc. if these parameter will be included in
the econometric model could drastically change the judgement on the op-
portunity of the operation because more value will be added on the “benefit
side” of the Benefit Cost equation.
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Figure 3.27: Cost benefit analysis. If the increase in GRP bar is higher than the aids
cost bar, the operation is cost effective.
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After the 1994 Northridge earthquake 43% of the firms that reported any
loss due to earthquake stated that some portion of the losses was gener-
ated by transportation damage and the related issues. The firms also stated
that 39% was the average loss connected with disruption to transportation
system[6]. The firm self-reported an average loss of 85 0026 USD. An in-
teresting remark on the same paper is about the severity of transportation
impacts to the businesses; in table 3.9 are reported the consequences on
a scale ranging from 1 to 5 as perceived by the participants to the survey.
The reported commutes employees that experienced higher time reaches up
to 40% of them. In the paper the authors estimate that the 6.5 billion USD
indirect losses caused by earthquake damage a 1.5 billion contribution was
due to transportation system damage.
According to Gordon et al. 1998[16] the four types of transport related in-
terruption(i.e. commuting, inhibited customer access, shipping and supply
disruption) caused a job loss of more than 15’700 person-year.
The strong connection between business damage and transportation net-
work damage has been shown after historical earthquakes. It’s importation
to focus on the connection between the two systems. Now it’s crucial to
investigate the relation between the business damage and the gross regional
product.
The schema of the analysis procedure has been shown by authors in [7]
and [30]. In figure 3.28 is reported the transportation simulation module
schema.
The transportation network has a spatial extension of approximately 100
km x 100 km. The topological model has been represented using 11’149 link,
5’924 nodes. The network has 41 bridges that are in shaded area of figure
3.29 . Transportation system has been simulated using Frank and Wolfe
algorithm, with a BRP cost function for links.
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Earthquake-Related Impact Average score % of scores
on 1 to 5 scale 4 or 5
Customer Access to Business 1.52 8.63%
Employee Access to Business 1.60 8.87%
Shipping Delays To Business 1.94 11.80%
Shipping Delays From Business 1.72 10.02%
Building Damage 1.38 4.48%
Utility Cut-Offs 1.69 10.99%
Higher Costs for Goods 1.32 3.96%
Inventory Loss or Damage 1.56 9.31%
Repair (not in Bldg. Damage) 1.70 10.84%
Seismic Retrofit (not in above) 1.21 2.34%
Table 3.9: Damage reported by firms after the 1994 Northridge earthquake due to
transportation system.
For the simulation of the consequences to transportation system some
hypotheses are assumed.
￿.￿.￿ Hypotheses
To represent the connection between the activity system and the transporta-
tion system some hypotheses are assumed.
The idea is to simulate the relation with a damaged network and a de-
mand that varies due to earthquake damage to activity system. The present
model doesn’t represent the damage to residential system. One should note
that the freight demand is directly related to business disruption while the
car demand is affected by business damage only for its business component.
In general terms the model is:
ODbusiness = f(BD) (75)
where:
ODbusiness is the transportation demand in general terms
BD is the business damage.
The above observation are translated into the following hypotheses:
• The transportation demand from centroid i to centroid j is reduced as:
– freight demand has a linear relationship
– light vehicles demand is reduced by a factor 0.5
• The transportation network (supply side of the problem), is damaged
by earthquake according to model in paragraph 2.6.4 .
The equation (75) can be particularized to account the hypotheses as:
ODeq,freight = OD0,ij ·BRF (76)
ODeq,light = OD0,ij · (0.5+ 0.5 ·BRF) (77)
where:
ODeq,freight is the transportation demand of trucks
ODeq,light is the transportation demand of cars
OD0,ij is the pre-earthquake transportation demand
BRF is the business residual functionality.
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Figure 3.28: Transportation module analysis schema.
In figure 3.30 there’s a representation of the analyzed business areas, in
yellow squares, and the centroids of the network represented as red dia-
monds. To complete the model it’s necessary to produce a correspondence
matrix from the business areas to the related centroids.
The relation from the damaged business areas and the related centroids
is expresses with an incidence table:
I(BUn;Centroid) (78)
where:
I is the incidence table where each row is composed
as follows:
BUn is the n-th business area
Centroid is the centroid.
In figure 3.31 the graphical representation that show this relation ta-
ble. The correspondence between each productive area and the centroids is
based on data from the census. With more data available the discretization
of the business area can be the one of each census tract, so the correspon-
dence table is no longer needed.
The resulting risk curve from the transportation analysis is given in figure
3.32 .
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The general loss model is:
Loss = D+ I (79)
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Figure 3.29: The partial Veneto transportation network topological model. The
shaded area represents the analysis area where the earthquake scenar-
ios are made and bridges damage are simulated.
D = BU+Br (80)
I = Time+ Product (81)
where:
D Direct Losses
I Indirect losses
Bu Direct losses connected to reconstruction cost in
buildings
Br Direct losses in term of bridge reconstruction or re-
habilitation cost
Time The increase in transportation network time can be
monetized 15.00 EUR per hour
Product Loss of production due to earthquake damage to
industrial facilities.
Direct losses are computed as the direct cost of replacement or repair of
industrial building as described in section 3.6 ; for bridges direct losses are
related to the cost of reconstruction or repair, and are parametrized to the
square footage of decking.
Indirect losses are defined as the reduction of productivity for businesses
with respect to baseline, that is the condition pre–earthquake. Indirect losses
related to transportation network are defined as the increase of total network
time with respect to baseline condition, i.e. with network un–damaged and
demand as pre–earthquake
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Since the code requires several calculations to obtain data on several busi-
ness and bridges, all the calculation have been performed in parallel, paral-
lelizing the for cycles when data was already available.
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Figure 3.30: The figure represents the centroids in the transportation network in red
diamonds. The yellow squares are the productive zones. The purple
lines are the link of the transportation network.
Figure 3.31: The figure shows the relation between the productive areas, as stars,
and the centroids of the transportation model. The colors match the
productive areas and the centroids.
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Figure 3.32: Risk in transportation network as delay due to damages to network.
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In this thesis an innovative procedure, using seismogenic zones, for earth-
quake scenario generation has been proposed. The proposed method can
be generalized for different areas and different seismogenic sources.
As set of hazard consistent scenario earthquakes for northeast italy has
been generated. These scenario earthquake can be used also for further
studied.
A model to describe residual functionality for productive buildings start-
ing from fragility description has been proposes. The model can be cali-
brated using historical data, if available.
A novel model for the recovery process of businesses has been proposed
and used to evaluate the process of recovery in time dimension.
The effects of external financial aids, e.g. funded by government after
catastrophes, have been investigated and a funding priority has been ex-
plored. The study expressed the need of caution in the assumption of input
parameters since the response of the model is directly related to that.
The relation between transportation system and production system has
been investigated and a relation model has been proposed and tested.
The possible applications of the proposed procedure in insurance and re–
insurance market is the use the proposed procedure to price products, to
improve portfolios of risks, to better understand emerging markets, to get a
fast post-event estimation of future expenses, etc.
In the field of community planning; for industrial association, the model
can be used to test the resilience of productive areas to extreme hazardous
events; government agencies can use the results of the presented tool as a
decision support systems that helps in evaluating different policies and eval-
uate possible losses of revenues from tax collection. Government agencies
could utilize the results to plan retrofitting interventions and decide how
financial helps should be allocated.
Civil protection agencies can use the present tool to map the risk of build-
ings, to determine, after an event, the number of injured people and the
buildings that require an assessment of their safety. The outcomes can be
used also two plan the emergency by defining the best paths to reduce in-
tervention times, if streets are congested or bridges collapsed.
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
1. Using energy instead of a seismic demand parameter the proposed
procedure can be extended to be multi-perils, accounting for earth-
quakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, wildfires, etc.
2. Extend the damage to bridges accounting effects of liquefaction, land-
slide.
3. Extend the damage to transportation network accounting the damage
to roads caused by the permanent ground displacement and account-
ing the loss of transit-ability due to debris on the road (especially in-
side the town center where building collapsing may invade the road
site).
4. Account the directionality of the earthquake, improve the seismic mod-
ule using physic modeling and simulation by mean of f.e. software of
the faulting mechanism and wave propagation. The stochastic earth-
quake models adequately represent the distribution of event sizes and
frequency and, hence, are widely used in the estimation of hazard.
However, the incorporation of mechanistic approach into a stochas-
tic model would provide a better understanding of seismic processes
underlying earthquakes.
5. Explore the economic effectiveness of financial aids for retrofitting in-
stead of ex-post funding for reconstruction.
6. Improve the accuracy of the economic analysis using more detailed
data for the economic modeling of the productive system.
7. Improve the transportation module using a generation model. This
implementation will allow the model to simulate if the phenomena of
demand surge will happen or not.
8. Improve the fragility description model including a simulation of each
bridge usign a f.e. model and non linear time history analysis.
9. Test the proposed procedure with data from insurance market to ex-
plore a new field of applicability.
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